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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT
Jason Alan Query
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Economics
June 2015
Title: The Impact of Transportation Costs and Trade Barriers on International Trade Flows
Because trade is seen as welfare improving for society, governments have long employed
their policy-making powers to increase trade levels. In recent years, no strategy has been more
employed by policy makers than free trade agreements. As free trade agreements become more
popular, world tariff levels rapidly approach zero. Given this, policy makers must look to other
methods to encourage trade. I examine how non-tariff trade barriers impact international trade
levels. By better understanding these trade barriers, policy makers will be able to make more
informed decisions.
To better understand non-tariff trade barriers, I begin with well-known impediments to
trade, including the border effect, transportation costs, and the trade creation and trade diversion
effects of regional trade agreements. I then demonstrate and examine heterogeneity in these trade
costs.
In Chapter II I examine the often-studied border effect, the notion that regions trade more
intra-nationally than internationally. I demonstrate that smaller regions are less attractive to
foreign trading partners than their larger counterparts. Fixed costs of crossing an international
border, as well as more effective marketing methods, mean economically larger U.S. states or
Canadian provinces see a smaller border effect. In Chapter III I look at how transportation costs
incurred within the exporting country impact trade levels. Using a unique instrumental variable
strategy, I show that the cost of getting a good to a port is a significant hindrance to trade.
Finally, in Chapter IV I show that the benefits of joining the European Union are heterogeneous
across countries. This means that while the E.U. may be beneficial on average, it may not be
beneficial for individual countries.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Because trade is seen as welfare improving for society, governments have long employed
their policy-making powers to increase trade levels. In recent years, no strategy has been more
employed by policy makers than free trade agreements. As free trade agreements become more
popular, world tariff levels rapidly approach zero. Given this, policy makers must look to other
methods of encouraging trade. I examine how non-tariff trade barriers impact international trade
levels. By better understanding these trade barriers, policy makers will be able to make more
informed decisions.
To better understand non-tariff trade barriers, I begin with well-known impediments to
trade, including the border effect, transportation costs, and the trade creation and trade diversion
effects of regional trade agreements. I then demonstrate and examine heterogeneity in these trade
costs.
Chapter II, titled “Market Size and Heterogeneity of Border Effects in Gravity Models of
Trade,” examines the impact of importer market size on the border effect. The border effect is
the idea that Canadian provinces trade more with other Canadian provinces than they do with
U.S. states after controlling for distance and other relevant variables. Because distance controls
for transportation costs, the border effect should represent fixed costs of crossing the U.S.-Canada
border. When selling to a larger market, the per-unit value of these fixed costs is necessarily
lower which makes a larger market a more attractive export destination. In addition, per-person
marketing costs are likely lower for economically larger regions as large cities make reaching
customers easier. I estimate the impact of importer size on the border effect by estimating the
standard gravity model and include an interaction between the border effect and importer size. I
find that a 10% increase in importer market size leads to a 2.6% increase in international trade
relative to intra-national trade. This result is robust to a variety of specifications, including non-
linear estimation.
Chapter III, titled “Differing Trade Elasticities for Intra- and International Distances:
a Gravity Approach,” focuses on the importance of internal trade costs in exporting items
internationally. The gravity model literature typically proxies for trade costs by included a
1
between-country distance variable. While this serves as a good proxy for trade costs incurred in
shipping a good from one country to another, it does not capture the trade costs incurred before
a good leaves the country. I estimate the effect of these internal trade costs by creating a measure
of internal distance, the distance a good travels before exiting the United States. In addition, I
use two different identification strategies to correct for the potential endogeneity bias created by
firms being able to pick their production location. I find that the internal trade costs are a more
important determinant of trade than external transportation costs.
Chapter IV is titled “Trade Creation and Trade Diversion in the European Union: Do
Larger Countries Benefit More?” and focuses on the border effect of the European Union. I
begin by estimating the average trade creation and trade diversion effects of joining the European
Union. Then, by estimating these effects for each member country, I demonstrate that the benefits
and costs of joining the European Union are heterogeneous across countries. I further explore
potential causes of this heterogeneity. I show that one cause of heterogeneous trade creation
and trade diversion effects is importer and exporter market size. In addition, various natural
country groups such as Scandinavian and Eastern Bloc countries face differing results of joining
the European Union.
Each chapter focuses on a different non-tariff trade barrier, but they ultimately seek to
accomplish the same goal. Lowering tariffs is no longer a practical trade-creating policy tool.
By looking at well known trade costs, and explaining precisely how these trade costs impact
trade levels, I seek to create a better informed policy maker. A complete understanding of the
border effect allows policy makers to focus on lowering the fixed costs of crossing the U.S.-
Canadian border. By knowing that internal transportation costs are a larger hindrance to trade
than between country transportation costs, policy makers should set as their main priority
improving the country’s transportation infrastructure. Through fully understanding trade costs,
this dissertation seeks to allow for better-informed trade policy.
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CHAPTER II
MARKET SIZE AND HETEROGENEITY OF BORDER EFFECTS
Introduction
The gravity model is one of the most successful empirical models employed in the trade
literature. It does a remarkable job of predicting the direction and volume of trade. One
particularly interesting empirical regularity found with the application of the gravity model is the
border puzzle, which Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001) call one of the six major puzzles of international
economics. Stated simply, controlling for relevant factors, regions are significantly more likely to
trade with other regions within their country than with regions outside the home country.
Since McCallum (1995) found that Canadian provinces have an alarmingly high propensity
to trade with other provinces, as compared to U.S. states, ceteris peribus, trade economists have
set out to explain this “border puzzle.” A seminal work on the subject is Anderson and van
Wincoop (2003), which finds that while the border puzzle still remains, when properly specifying
the model used in the border effect literature the magnitude is much smaller than previously
thought.
In this paper, I contribute to the border effect literature in two key ways. First, I
demonstrate that the border effect is heterogeneous across states and provinces and suggest
one potential cause of this heterogeneity: economically larger regions may have significantly
smaller border effects because the costs associated with crossing the Canada-U.S. border are fixed,
meaning the per-unit impact of these costs are smaller for larger importing markets. My second
major contribution to the border effect literature is that I formalize this “market size” effect both
theoretically and empirically, showing that importer market sizes positively affect international
trade more than intranational trade, even after accounting for multilateral resistance terms. In
addition, I show that a region’s population density is a significant determinant of its border effect.
These empirical results are derived through the use of a unique data set which includes all U.S.
states, something the previous literature frequently fails to consider. I briefly demonstrate that
the exclusion of small states by prior studies leads to a biased estimate of the border effect.
This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section I briefly review the literature on
gravity, border effect, and market size. In section three I discuss the theoretical implications of
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transportation costs being a function of importer size. In the fourth section, I describe the data
used in the paper. In section five I demonstrate the sampling bias present in previous border
effect papers as well as individually estimate each region’s border effect. I find heterogeneous
border effects and list potential causes for this result. In section six, I test for the presence of the
market size effect. In section seven, I perform a variety of robustness checks. The eighth section
concludes.
Literature Review
Since Tinbergen (1962) developed the gravity model of trade, it has been an empirical
work horse for international trade economists. Though economists have been using the gravity
model since the 1960s, it stood only on its empirical success until Anderson (1979), when it gained
theoretical justification. Now, more than thirty years after Anderson (1979) and more than fifty
years after its introduction, trade economists still use the gravity model to understand the size,
direction, and causes of bilateral trade flows.
One important use of the gravity model has been to explain the importance of trade
costs. In Anderson and van Wincoop (2004), the authors explain that trade costs, especially
non-policy trade costs, continue to be large. Taylor, Robindeaux, and Jackson (2004) argues
that transportation costs at the United States-Canadian border costs the countries $10.3 billion
annually. Disdier and Head (2008) demonstrates that despite market globalization, the distance
effect continues to persist in trade. Hillberry and Hummels (2008) shows that trade costs reduce
the extensive margin of trade, so exporters ship less varieties, with little impact on the per-
unit value of the goods shipped. On the other hand, Chaney (2008) and Helpman, Melitz and
Rubinstein (2008) develop models that show both the intensive and extensive margins changing
with trade costs.
McCallum (1995) employs the gravity model to examine what has become known as
the border puzzle. In the paper, McCallum uses a standard gravity model to examine trade
between Canadian provinces and U.S. states or other provinces, adding only a dummy variable
to indicate if the trade is from one province to another. The author finds that, holding other
relevant variables constant, trade between two Canadian provinces is more than twenty times
larger than trade between that same province and an otherwise identical U.S. state. While it is
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not particularly unexpected that a province is more inclined to trade with another province, the
magnitude of the border effect was quite surprising and led to considerable follow-up research
attempting to explain the magnitude.
One potential explanation of the border effect is that a border dummy variable is proxying
for tariffs or other trade policies. However, Wolf (2000) shows that state borders matter within
the United States, implying that the border effect must be proxying for more than just U.S. trade
policy. Wolf (2005) finds a similar result in Poland. Hillberry and Hummels (2003) demonstrates
that the Wolf (2000) result is driven by wholesaling, while Millimet and Osang (2007) shows that
controlling for past levels of trade can explain the state home bias. I demonstrate a different
factor in determining the border effect: importer market size.
Likely the most well known follow-up to McCallum (1995) is Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003). In their paper, Anderson and van Wincoop develop a structural specification for
the model McCallum employs, something missing from the original paper. This theoretical
justification makes clear that the McCallum paper suffers from omitted variables bias. Specifically,
the equation should include what Anderson and van Wincoop call a “multilateral resistance”
variable which captures the notion that bilateral trade depends not only on the prices of the two
regions involved, but also the prices of all outside options. Through a demanding econometric
methodology, the authors construct multilateral resistance terms, allowing them to estimate the
border effect consistently and efficiently. While they do find a sizable border effect of roughly
20% to 50%, this number is considerably smaller than the effect discovered in McCallum (1995).
Another key aspect of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) is the inclusion of state to state trade,
which McCallum had omitted. This allows the authors to examine the border effect going from
Canada to the United States and compare it to the effect of moving from the United States to
Canada. They find that the border effect is much more pronounced for Canadian provinces than
for U.S. states.1
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) is not without its critics, however. In Santos Silva and
Tenreyro (2006), the authors show that using Poisson Quasi-Maximum Likelihood estimation
techniques yield very different results than one would get using log-linear specifications, as both
McCallum and Anderson and van Wincoop do. I use this as a robustness check to my log-linear
1There also exists a considerable literature examining the border effect using price data, such as Engel and
Rogers (1996), Parsley and Wei (2000), and Gorodnichenko and Tesar (2009).
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specifications. By examining the proportions of trade costs paid by buyers and sellers, Anderson
and Yotov (2010) demonstrates that the previous border effect literature suffers from a downward
bias of the border effect variable.
In Balistreri and Hillberry (2007), the authors argue that the Anderson and van Wincoop
assumption of symmetric trade costs is inappropriate. In addition, the authors argue that the
inclusion of U.S. to U.S. trade data is the only driving force behind the Anderson and van
Wincoop result. Using Anderson and van Wincoop’s structural model without state to state
trade alters the McCallum border effect estimate very little, implying that perhaps Anderson
and van Wincoop have not found a “solution” to the border puzzle. In essence, Balistreri and
Hillberry (2007) show that Anderson and van Wincoop’s (2003) estimates suffer from a sampling
bias. Similarly, Matsuo and Ishise (2012) add the missing U.S. states to the Anderson and van
Wincoop sample to document that this exclusion generates sampling bias. My analysis provides
an explanation for the small state sampling bias; I show that this bias can be explained by the
fixed-cost portion of crossing the border resulting in a smaller per-unit impact of the border on
larger markets. An incomplete working paper, Coughlin and Novy (2011), also demonstrates a
size-based omitted variable bias. However, the authors do not explore the connection to marketing
costs as I do in this paper but assume it comes from aggregation bias.
In Redding and Venables (2004), the authors construct a model of trade that yields
a gravity equation that contains exporter and importer fixed effects. Along a similar track,
Feenstra (2002) estimates the border effect gravity equations three different ways: using published
price indexes, using the methods outlined in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), and including
exporter and importer fixed effects. Feenstra concludes that the fixed effect methodology
produces consistent estimates of the average border effect, while simultaneously being much
easier to implement than the Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) methodology, and thus could
be considered the preferred methodology for estimating border effects. I use this methodology to
account for the multilateral resistance terms in sections six and seven. In “Bonus vetus OLS,”
Baier and Bergstrand (2009) use a Taylor-series expansion to arrive at a consistent method
of estimating gravity models without the econometric rigor of the Anderson and van Wincoop
specification. This methodology has the added benefit of allowing for comparative statics, which
cannot be done in the Feenstra (2002) specification.
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Recently, Dias (2011b) argues that the trade cost component of the gravity equation should
best be estimated using a polynomial function that would allow distance to enter the gravity
equation in a way not typically employed in the literature. This determination follows from the
author developing a model of trade based on Eaton and Kortum (2002), which Dias modifies to
include FDI and the idea that some trade costs may vary with distance while others may not.
In Dias (2011a), the author argues that an interaction between the border dummy and distance
should be added to the typical gravity equation. In addition, the author argues linear estimation
techniques bias the border effect upward and that non-linear estimation techniques must be
used. Lastly, the author argues that by including the interaction between the border dummy
and distance, the McCallum (1995) border effect disappears, indicating distance matters more
for international trade than it does for intra-national trade. I show that the market-size effect is
present even after controlling for differing distance effects.
My paper is also related to an extensive literature on how both importer and exporter
market sizes impact trade patterns. Exporter market sizes are often linked to trade through a
supply-side story. A seminal paper on the subject is Krugman (1980). In this paper, Krugman
creates a model with transportation costs and economies of scale in production. These
assumptions drive the “market size” effect, which says that locations with a larger market for a
good are more likely to be exporters of that good. Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005) demonstrate
a positive relationship between area population, which they use as a measure of market size, and
average firm size. Combining this with Bernard and Jensen (1999), who demonstrate that larger
firms tend to export, and the resulting implication is that there is a positive relationship between
exporter market size and exporting. However, none of these papers relate any market size effect to
the border effect, as I do in this paper.
There are also papers discussing the impact of importer market size on trade. One such
paper, Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2005), shows that the fixed costs of entering a market as
outlined in Melitz (2003) and Chaney (2008) are an important determinant of the relationship
between market size and firm entry. Another paper is Arkolakis (2010). Arkolakis creates a
model using the general framework of Melitz (2003) and Chaney (2008), adding a“marketing
cost.” The cost of reaching a certain number of consumers is assumed to be decreasing in the
market’s population size while reaching the next customer in a given market is increasing in cost.
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This allows Arkolakis to reconcile trade models with the finding of Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz
(2011) that the number of exports to a given market is positively associated with the size of the
market. In contrast to these papers, I am taking the further step of linking importer market size
to the magnitude of the border effect.
Theoretical Framework
There exist fixed costs of crossing the border between the United States and Canada.
These can include delays in clearing customs or fees associated with understanding regulatory
requirements for crossing the border. Indeed, in 1993 (the year of my data), with the Canada-
United States Free Trade Agreement well into its life, there likely are very few variable costs
associated with crossing the Canadian-U.S. border. As such, these fixed costs could potentially
explain much of the border effect. In addition, because these costs are fixed, the costs being
spread across more goods implies that the costs have a smaller impact on larger markets. I call
this effect, in the border effect context, the “market size effect.” Thus, the border effect could be
explained in part by the importer market size.
I develop a model that highlights why this market-size effect on the border is important to
capture. I adapt a model by Eaton and Kortum (2002), explicitly making trade costs a function of
importer market size. This allows for very different outcomes when employing comparative statics.
The model outlined in Eaton and Kortum (2002) is well suited as a framework for my empirical
model developed below, as it results in an empirically testable gravity equation, and it does so by
allowing for multiple regions to produce homogeneous, rather than differentiated goods.
The Eaton and Kortum (2002) model is one of Ricardian trade, where firms have access to
differing technologies. There is a continuum of goods k ∈ [0, 1], region i’s efficiency in producing k
is denoted by zi(k), the cost of a bundle of inputs is region - but not good - specific, and is labeled
ci, and there are constant returns to scale. This results in a cost of producing good k in region i
of cizi(k) .
Region i’s efficiency (or technology) at producing good k, zi(k), is assumed to be a random
draw from a region-specific probability distribution Fi(z) = Pr[zi ≤ z]. By the law of large
numbers, Fi(z) is the fraction of goods in region i whose efficiency is less than z. As in Eaton
and Kortum (2002), I assume that the distribution of efficiencies in a region follows a Fre´chet
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distribution, so that
Fi(z) = e
−Tiz−θ (2.1)
where Ti > 0 is the location of the distribution and can be thought of as the state of technology
in region i, and θ is the variation in the distribution. The variable θ is assumed the same for
all regions. A larger Ti implies a higher probability of a larger efficiency draw for any good k.
A higher θ implies less variation in the distribution. Thus, according to Eaton and Kortum, Ti
governs a region’s absolute advantage, while θ governs its comparative advantage.
Trade costs follow the typical iceberg assumption. That is, delivering one unit of a good
from exporter region i to importer region j requires producing and shipping dij units of the
good, where dij is referred to as trade costs. A few underlying assumptions about the trade cost
component are that dii = 1 so that there are no internal trade costs, that dij > 1 ∀i 6= j so that
there are positive external trade costs and that the triangle inequality holds so that dij < dimdmj .
To reflect that trade costs may be a function of importer market size, I adapt the Eaton
and Kortum (2002) model to explicitly make the trade cost parameter a function of importer
market size, denoted Yj , but not exporter market size, so that trade costs are equal to dij(Yj).
The effects of this are immediate. While Eaton and Kortum themselves do not assume identical
trade costs (in other words, that dij = dji), many empirical specifications of the gravity equation
do rely on this assumption. However, in this model, except in the highly unlikely case that Yi =
Yj ∀i 6= j, it is extremely unlikely that the assumption of identical trade costs will hold.2 Note
that I am not assuming that the trade costs are solely determined by importer market size, so it
need not be the case that dij = dmj . For simplicity and clarity, I write the trade cost variable as
dij .
Combining the discussion of trade costs, input costs, and efficiency described above, one
arrives at a price of good k in region j that is purchased from region i:
Pij(k) =
(
ci
zi(k)
)
dij (2.2)
2It is technically possible for the trade costs to be identical, so that dij = dji even if it is not the case that
Yi = Yj ∀i 6= j. This can be true if any other relevant variable for determining trade costs between partners vary in
a way that exactly offsets the differing size effect. However, while it may be probable for a few trade pairs to have
the same trade costs in either direction, it remains highly unlikely for all trade pairs.
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The model is one of perfect competition, so the price actually paid in region j for good k can be
written as:
Pj(k) = min {Pij(k); i = 1, ..., N} (2.3)
where N is the total number of regions, including region j. Consumers buy Q(k) amounts of good
k in order to maximize the CES utility function
U =
[∫ 1
0
Q(k)(σ−1)/σ) dk
] σ
σ−1
(2.4)
subject to the budget constraint that the total spending in region j is equal to Yj , where σ > 0 is
the elasticity of substitution.
Substituting equation 4.2 into equation 2.1 yields the following distribution of prices from
region i to region j:
Gij(p) = Pr[Pij ≤ p] = 1− Fj(cidij/p) (2.5)
Gij(p) = 1− e−[Ti(cidij)−θ]pθ (2.6)
If the lowest price at which region j can purchase a good is from purchasing domestically, they
will do so. Thus, the lowest price in region j will be less than the domestic price p so long as at
least one region, m, satisfies the constraint pmj < p. This implies that the distribution of goods
region j imports, Gj(p) is given by:
Gj(p) = 1−
N∏
i=1
[1−Gij(p)] (2.7)
Substituting equation 2.6 into equation 2.7 then gives:
Gj(p) = 1− e−Φjpθ (2.8)
where Φj =
∑N
i=1 Ti (cidij)
−θ
. As Eaton and Kortum note, Φj , which they call the price
parameter, is an important component of trade analysis because it shows how world technological
levels Ti, world input costs ci, and geographic trade barriers dij impact the prices for any given
region j. Remembering that because dij is a function of importer market size Yj , Φj is also
determined by Yj .
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Eaton and Kortum (2002) note an important result from this analysis. The probability that
region i is the lowest cost supplier of a good is given by:
piij =
Ti (cidij)
−θ
Φj
(2.9)
Due to the assumption of a continuum of goods, this also represents the fraction of goods that j
buys from i. Calling Yj region j’s total spending and Xij the amount of spending in region j on
goods from region i, this yields:
Xij
Yj
=
Ti (cidij)
−θ
Φj
=
Ti (cidij)
−θ∑N
k=1 Tk (ckdkj)
−θ (2.10)
By noting that region i’s total sales, Qi is given by:
Qi =
N∑
m=1
Xim = Tic
−θ
i
N∑
m=1
d−θimYm
Φm
(2.11)
solving for Tic
−θ
i , and substituting these into equation 2.11 gives an expression for the sales from
region i to region j analogous to the typical gravity equation:
Xij =
(
dij
Pj
)−θ
∑N
m=1
(
dim
Pm
)−θ
Ym
YjQi (2.12)
Note that exporter sales Qi and importer purchases, Yj , can be thought of as exporter and
importer GDP. As with Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), the exporter GDP enters the equation
with unit elasticity. In addition, the trade between region i and region j depend on world price
levels, not just the price levels of the two regions involved. Recall that dij , the trade costs of
shipping from i to j, are a function of the importer GDP, which is equivalent to Yj . Thus, while
Yj enters by itself as a multiplicative term with unit elasticity, trade between i and j also depends
on Yj through trade costs; thus, Yj does not necessarily have unit elasticity.
This equation is able to highlight the bias generated by ignoring the market size effect when
estimating a gravity equation. To show this, I hold the expression
∑N
m=1
(
dim
Pm
)−θ
Ym constant.
Because the gravity model here is not a model over time, this term, which can be thought of as
the multilateral resistance term, will be constant for each given region. This can also be thought
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of as the small region assumption, such that no state or province is large enough to impact the
price index. Thus, taking the derivative of equation 2.12 with respect to Yj yields:
∂Xij
∂Yj
=
(
dij
Pj
)−θ
Qi∑N
m=1
(
dim
Pm
)−θ
Ym
−
θ
(
dij
Pj
)−1−θ
QiYj
(
∂dij
∂Yj
)
∑N
m=1
(
dim
Pm
)−θ
Ym
(2.13)
The first component of this derivative is the part typically captured by gravity specifications.
However, the second component is typically ignored by omitting trade cost dij ’s dependence
on importer market size Yj . Because dij is a per unit cost and fixed costs of the market are
likely present, I assume
(
∂dij
∂Yj
)
< 0, or that a larger importing market faces lower per-unit
trade costs (through, for example, a more developed and efficient infrastructure); this means
that typical gravity estimation is underestimating the impact of importer market size on trade
flows. In section six, I correct for the omitted variable bias inherent in the previous border effect
specifications.
Data
This paper uses inter-regional trade data for all ten Canadian provinces and fifty U.S.
states in the year 1993. The primary data used for this analysis comes from three primary
sources. These include Statistic Canada’s Input-Output Division, the Canadian International
Merchandise Trade Database, and the U.S. Census Bureau. Interprovincial merchandise trade
data for the year 1993 is provided online by Anderson, and comes from the interprovincial
merchandise trade from Statics Canada’s Input-Output (IO) Division.
Province-to-state and state-to-province trade data comes from the Canadian International
Merchandise Trade Database.3 McCallum (1995) modified these numbers using trade ratios
and the IO trade numbers, while Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) follow Helliwell (1998) in
making the same adjustment at a more detailed industry level. I have opted to not make these
adjustments, with the minor exception of Anderson and van Wincoop’s “rest of U.S.” observation,
which I leave as constructed in their data. I drop all intra-regional trade observations in this
paper. To keep all state trade numbers comparable, I use the unadjusted trade numbers for all
3This database can be located at http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/cimt-cicm/home-accueil?lang=eng
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states, including those originally in the McCallum and Anderson and van Wincoop specifications.
All trade numbers are converted to 1993 U.S. dollars.
The 1993 Commodity Flow Survey (CFS), conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau, provides
within-state and state-to-state trade numbers for the year 1993. The reported trade numbers
are then scaled down by a factor of 3,025/5,846 for consistency with Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003). This scaling was performed by Anderson and van Wincoop for three reasons. First, while
the Canadian trade data contains only shipments from source to final user, the CFS data contains
all shipments. In addition, goods intended to be exported but first shipped domestically are
included in the CFS data. Lastly, the CFS data does not include agriculture or parts of mining
that are included in the Canadian data. This scaling methodology is not without its detractors.
See, for example, Balistreri and Hillberry (2007).
Of the 3600 trading pairs in the sample, 297 are excluded from the log-linear regressions;
73 pairs are excluded because the value of exports from one partner to the other is zero, so when
the value of trade is logged these become undefined. These pairs are included in the non-linear
estimations presented. The other 224 are excluded because there is not sufficiently reliable data
on trade from the relevant origin to the relevant destination. Of these 297 omitted pairs, 114
have either Alaska or Hawaii as one of the partners and would be omitted from the 48 state
specifications anyway. Other exporting regions that omit more than 10% of their partners are
Kentucky, Louisiana, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
Distances between interprovincial pairs, interstate pairs, and province-to-state pairs were
taken from Anderson, who used kilometer greater circle distances from each regions’ capital. The
gross product of Canadian provinces were taken from Statistics Canada. Gross state products for
U.S. states were taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.4
Empirical Evidence of Systematic Heterogeneity in Border Effects
Reasons for Modifying the Anderson and van Wincoop Sample
In McCallum (1995), only thirty states and ten Canadian provinces are included in the
data set. A list of states excluded in McCallum can be found in Table 1 (see Appendix for all
tables). McCallum notes that these thirty states make up 90% of Canada-USA trade in the
4GSP can be located at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/regional/gdp state/1998/gsp 0698.htm
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year he examined. Desiring to remain comparable with McCallum, Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003) also used only thirty states, though they constructed a “rest of U.S.” observation from the
additional twenty states and the District of Columbia. As such, much of the literature on border
effects has been written without incorporating the full set of states in the United States.
This omission of certain states potentially results in sampling bias. McCallum’s sample
includes only those states that border Canada or are the largest, by economic size, in the United
States. Table 1 lists those states omitted from McCallum’s sample. Trade theory (and indeed the
gravity equation itself) says that these states should have systematically higher trade numbers
with Canadian provinces than those excluded from the sample. I begin by examining if adding
these twenty states significantly impacts border effect estimates using a gravity equation that uses
importer and exporter fixed effects to control for multilateral resistance terms.
I estimate the gravity model using the Anderson and van Wincoop sample, which adds
state to state trade to the McCallum sample, using only the 30 states included in the paper and a
“rest of U.S.” composite y. I also estimate the gravity equation using all 48 states.5 To estimate
these equations, I follow Feenstra (2002), who demonstrates that importer and exporter fixed
effects control for multilateral resistance effects. As such, I estimate the following equation:
ln
(
Xij
YiYj
)
= β4 ln dij + β5δ
ij + αi + αj + ij (2.14)
where δij is a dummy variable equal to unity if the region i is a province and region j is a state,
or vice versa, and αi and αj are exporter and importer fixed effects respectively. Note here that
δij is a dummy variable indicating international trade.
Table 2 reports the results of the Anderson and van Wincoop specifications. The first
column reports the results for equation 2.14 using the original sample of thirty states and ten
provinces. Column 2 reports the specification with all fifty states, and column 3 removes Hawaii
5Alaska and Hawai’i are excluded for peculiarities other than size, as is typical in much of the state trade
literature.
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and Alaska from the specification. All variables are statistically significant at the 1% level and the
border effect is negative in all specifications.
It is important to note that Feenstra estimates an average effect of 4.7, while column 1 of
Table 2 indicates an effect of 6.4 (e1.866). This effect is also greater than that of Anderson and
van Wincoop (5.2). This is likely due to the trade data being unadjusted in these specifications
(though adjusted in Anderson and van Wincoop and Feenstra). Comparatively, the 48 state
specification has an average border effect of 7.46 (e2.009). This number is higher than the
thirty state specification; it represent a 16.5% increase in the border effect. This suggests
that by excluding the 18 states I have added to the specification, Anderson and Van Wincoop
underestimated the border effect. However, it should be noted that the 48-state specification does
not result in a magnitude as high as that of the McCallum specification.
It is also important to test if the 48-state specification is statistically significantly different
from the 30-state specification. To do this, I estimated the equation including all variables in
equation 2.14 as well as each of those variables (including the fixed effects) interacted with a
dummy variable equal to unity if the observation was present in the old sample only. Column
4 of Table 2 reports the results of this significant test. Both the distance effect and the border
effect are significantly different from the thirty state specification at the 1% significance level. The
positive sign and large magnitude of the coefficient for the border dummy interacted with the in-
original-sample dummy indicates that the border effect is much more substantial for the 18 added
states than it is for the thirty included states, implying heterogeneous border effects. These results
provide strong evidence that a sampling bias is introduced by excluding the smaller 18 states
resulting in an underestimation of the border effect, thus verifying the results found in Matsuo
and Ishise (2012), among others. For the remainder of this paper I use the 48 state sample.
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Heterogeneous Border Effects
Before demonstrating the market size effect discussed in the theoretical model, I first
examine whether regions have differing border effects. To estimate individual region border effects,
I estimate the following equation for each state and province6, restricting either i or j to be equal
to the region of interest:
ln
(
Xij
YiYj
)
= β4 ln dij + β5δ
ij + ij (2.15)
where Xij is the exports from region i to region j, Yi is the gross product of region i, dij is the
distance from region i to region j, and δij is a dummy variable equal to unity if region i is located
in a different country than region j. Thus, to estimate Texas’ border effect, I estimate equation
2.15 for each observation in which Texas is an importer or an exporter.
Note that this is equation 2.14, but without the fixed effects. The fixed effects are excluded
due to concerns about degrees of freedom. For this reason, I do not claim to have precisely
measured each region’s border effect. Instead, I only use these measures to examine patterns
in region-specific border effects. Later, I estimate market size effects on the border effect using
the full sample where I can employ exporter and importer fixed effects to properly control for
multilateral resistance.
Table 3 reports coefficients on the border dummy, the standard errors of these estimates,
and the border effects for each of the 48 U.S. states, where the border effect is calculated as
e|Border Coefficient|. Table 4 reports these same estimates for all ten Canadian provinces. All
estimated border coefficients are negative and all are statistically significant at the 10% level or
greater except for Michigan and Minnesota, which are negative but statistically insignificant.
The first thing to note is that the border effects for the Canadian provinces are significantly
larger in magnitude than those of the United States, with the smallest border effect for a
6I do not estimate individual border effects for Hawaii or Alaska and also excluded these observations in the
calculation of other regions’ border effects.
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Canadian province being more than double the largest border effect of any U.S. state. This is
consistent with AvW’s finding that the border has a larger impact on the smaller country.
However, even within Canada there is significant variation in the border effects. British
Columbia (BC) has the lowest border effect of any Canadian province with 11.48, meaning BC is
eleven times more likely to trade with a Canadian province than a U.S. state, controlling for the
effects of gross product and distances. Prince Edward Island has the largest border effect of all
Canadian provinces (and indeed, all regions) with an unrealistic 114.01. In Figure 1 (see Appendix
for all figures), I depict the pattern of border effects for Canadian provinces.
There is also considerable heterogeneity in the border effects of the states, with border
effects ranging from 1.29 to 5.88. Michigan has the smallest border effect, though its border is not
statistically significantly different from one. The same is true of Minnesota, with an estimated
border effect of 1.62. It is interesting to note that both of these states border Canada. New
Mexico has the largest border effect of any U.S. state, estimated to be 5.88. In Figure 2, I show
the pattern of border effects for U.S. states.
One pattern of interest is that larger states generally have smaller border effects. For
example, note that Texas and Florida (two of the states with the smallest border effect) are
among the top five gross state products, whereas Montana (with a very high border effect) has the
fourth lowest gross state product of all states. New York and Illinois are in the top five in gross
state product and also have relatively small border effects. On the Canadian side, Prince Edward
Island has a far larger border effect than any other Canadian province. Its gross product is also
only one fourth of the second smallest province by gross product. One potential anomaly to this
explanation, however, is the state of California. Despite the fact that California has more gross
product than any state or province in the sample, the impact of the border on trade with Canada
is significantly high. One potential explanation for this anomaly is that California trades heavily
with Mexico and as such does not rely on Canadian trade as much as other states. Another
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potential anomaly is North Dakota, which has the lowest gross product of all included states,
but the border has little impact on its trade with Canada.7
There are many potential causes of this size-dependent border effect heterogeneity. One
potential reason that larger regions tend to show smaller border effects is the omitted variable bias
discussed in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). The larger a region, the smaller the multilateral
resistance term for that region. If multilateral resistance terms are positively correlated with
a border effect, the omission of importer and exporter fixed effects (and thus the multilateral
resistance term) from equation 2.15 would show larger regions having smaller border effects. All
specifications in section six and seven of this paper correct for this bias by including importer and
exporter fixed effects.
Another potential cause of the heterogeneity is that tariffs may impact different regions in
different ways. For example, a large Canadian tariff on corn production is likely to have a larger
effect on Nebraska or Iowa, which produce large amounts of corn, than Florida, which produces
very little corn. While I believe this is an important potential cause of the heterogeneity, my data
do not contain industry-level trade and as such I am unable to test this. I leave this potential
avenue of border effect heterogeneity for future research.
Dias (2011a) argues for an interaction between distance and the border dummy, but given
Figure 2 this cannot be the complete story. The argument is that international transportation is
different from domestic transportation in such a way that distance matters more to international
trade. This would be the case if international shipping is less competitive than intranational
shipping. While most of the low-border effect states do tend to be in New England or the
Midwest, which are close to the Canadian provinces, Texas and Florida have small border effects
despite their distance from Canada; similarly, Montana, which actually borders Canada, is among
the highest border effect states. I include a test of this potential avenue of heterogeneity in my
7It should be noted that of the potential trading partners in the sample, trade from North Dakota to 8 of the
partners are omitted due to zero trade values or insufficient data. Exports from 15 partners to North Dakota are
omitted for the same reason. Thus, North Dakota’s puzzling border effect could be caused by omitted observations.
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econometric specifications, though it should be noted that Dias (2011a) finds no such effect using
OLS.
As mentioned in the theory section, while the multilateral resistance terms are likely
one part of the explanation for border effect heterogeneity, the “market size effect” is also an
important plausible explanation of size-dependent border effect heterogeneity. In the next section,
I disentangle these two effects by including importer and exporter fixed effects to correct for
multilateral resistance terms while also including an interaction between the border effect dummy
and importer market size to help explain the market size effect.
Market Size and the Border Effect: Empirical Results
To examine the issues discussed in the previous section, I run three new gravity
specifications, all of which are built on the baseline regression model given by equation 2.14. I first
add to equation 2.14 an interaction of the dummy variable and the log of distance in an attempt
to replicate Dias (2011a). In another specification, I add an interaction of the border dummy and
the log of gross product of the importing state or province. Lastly, I add both interactions into
one equation. As such, my preferred specification is:
ln
(
Xij
YiYj
)
= β1 ln dij + β2δ
ij + β3δ
ij × ln dij + β4δij × lnYj + αi + αj + ij (2.16)
The results of these specification are found in Table 5. Column 1 contains the results of
the specification that includes 48 states and no interaction terms and is included for comparison.
In column 2, I report the specification that includes the interaction of distance and the border
dummy. In column 3, I report the specification which includes the interaction of the border
dummy and the log of the importer’s gross product. Lastly, column 4 reports the inclusion of
both interaction terms as to avoid potential omitted variable bias. Note that all results mentioned
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below are contingent on trade occurring between the two regions. This is caused by the log-
linearization of the model.
In column 3, I test the market-size effect on the border. Column 3 demonstrates that
gross product impacts the measure of the border effect. Significant at the 1% level, the larger
the economy of a trading partner, ceteris paribus, the smaller the effect the border has on trade.
Specifically, a 10% increase in the total size of an importing state or province would result
in a 2.6% increase in international trade beyond the same market size increase’s impact on
intranational trade. The last column acts as a robustness check, demonstrating that this market-
size effect is robust to the inclusion of the distance-border interaction that Dias (2011a) highlights
as being important.8 The market-size interaction term remains significant at the 1% level (the
distance interaction is significant at the 10% level) and the coefficient estimates, while smaller in
both cases, are nearly the same as when only one interaction term is include. Thus, I conclude
that market size has a larger positive effect for cross-border trade than it does for intranational
trade.
In Figure 3 I present a graphical representation of the implied border effect as derived from
Table 5 column 3. That is, the thick solid line in Figure 3 is:
bordereffecti = −4.880 + 0.256× lnYi (2.17)
The graph brings to light several interesting results. First, the thin solid line represents the mean
log of importer market size, which is equal to 11.03057. This implies a border effect of -1.913,
which is very close to the -2.009 estimated in column 1 of Table 5. Prince Edward Island (the
dashed line), which is the smallest economy in the sample, has an implied border effect of -2.89,
while California (the dashed-dotted line), the largest economy in the sample, has an implied
8It should be noted here that I actually find that distance has a larger impact on intranational trade than
it does international trade. This is contrast to the results of Dias (2011a). Column 4 demonstrates that these
conflicting results are not driven by the inclusion of the GDP interaction term. However, it is plausible that
distance impacts international trade less than intranational trade, as I find. This would be consistent with the
idea of a fixed cost of crossing the border.
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border effect of only -1.21, significantly smaller than even that of the average border effect.
Perhaps the most important result demonstrated on this graph is the dotted line, the size the
importer would need to be such that there would be no border effect. The log of importer GDP,
in millions, would have to be 18.142. Thus, for a state or province to have no border effect it
would have to have an economy of $75 trillion dollars, or nearly ninety times the 1993 California
economy. Thus, for no plausible region size will the border effect completely disappear.
In the above analysis, I use the interaction of the market size and the border effect to proxy
for a possible effect of fixed costs in crossing the border. However, marketing costs, MCij , are
likely a function of variables beyond just economic size of importer Yj . However, there are other
marketing costs that may impact the border effect. For example, Arkolakis (2010) allows for
the possibility that it is less costly to market to regions with a larger population. To estimate
this potential effect, I include an interaction between the border dummy and importer logged
population density. I use population density, rather than population count, because populations
are not uniformly distributed within regions. One million people concentrated in a region the size
of Rhode Island would likely be much easier to reach with marketing than the same million people
spread across Montana.
The results for these estimations are reported in Table 6. The first column reproduces
the most diverse specification from Table 5. Column two adds the importer population density
interaction, which demonstrates the impact of ease of marketing on the border effect. The first
important result is that importer population density has a statistically significant positive effect.
According to column two, a 10% increase in the population density of an importer will increase
international trade to that region by 1.35% more than intranational trade. This indicates that
population-density based marketing costs are an important determinant of the border effect.
It is also important to note that while the magnitude of the market size effect (the interaction
of the border dummy and the log of importer market size) has changed, the magnitude is not
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statistically significantly different than that found in column one. As such, both region economic
size and population density of a region are important determinants of that region’s border effect.
Robustness Checks
As mentioned in the previous section, there are many potential explanations for the
observed geographical patterns of individual border effects. In this section, I perform a variety of
robustness checks to assure the reader that the importer market size effect is not simply proxying
for some other cause of heterogeneous border effects. I begin by adding exporter market size into
the specification and by adding a coastal region dummy variable to the specification. I conclude
this section by performing non-linear estimations of the gravity equation.
Exporter Market Size
One potential concern is that importer market size may be highly correlated with any
potential exporter market size effect. The idea that home market demand makes a country more
likely to export a good is a well known concept in the trade literature and is commonly referred
to as the home market effect (see Krugman 1980). Transportation costs make it more costly to
export a good than to sell it locally, so a competitive advantage is given to producers of a good
near the market that demands it. If a larger population results in higher demand for a good,
exporter market size could have a positive impact on trade totals, which may differ when crossing
a border.
To test for this possibility, I run the regression including both an interaction between
importer market size and the border dummy and an interaction between exporter market size
and the border dummy. The results can be found in column 2 of Table 7. The importer market
size interaction is robust to the inclusion of the exporter market size interaction. The importer
market size effect is still significant at the 1% level and positive. In addition, the magnitude is
functionally the same. The exporter market size interaction enters the specification positively and
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statistically at the 1% level. The regression shows that a 10% increase in exporter market size
will increase trade with international partners by 1.59% more than it would increase intranational
trade. This result is quite interesting. Given the extensive home bias literature, it is no surprise
that exporter market size is an important factor in determining trade. However, the result that
this home bias has a larger impact on international trade is a new one. One potential explanation
of this would be the presence of increasing returns to scale. If the producers of a good face
increasing returns to scale, higher domestic sales potentially makes these producers better able
to overcome any fixed or variable costs of crossing a border.
Coastal States
By noting that Texas and Florida, along with much of the Northeastern United States, in
particular have very low border effects, one may think that having access to a coast, and thus
ocean transportation, may have an impact on the border effect. To allow for this potentiality, I
include in column 3 of Table 7 a dummy variable equal to one if the importing state has an ocean
coast and a dummy variable equal to one if the exporting region is on the coast. Even with the
inclusion of these dummy variables, the market size interaction is still statistically significant and
positive and the magnitude is mostly unchanged.
An importing country having a coastal border has a statistically and economically negative
impact on trade. While this result may seem counterintuitive, it is likely caused by the fact that
this is an examination of trade specifically between the United States and Canada. Coastal access
would have little impact on the transportation costs between states and provinces but would
have a large impact on the transportation costs from European and Asian countries. As such,
these foreign countries may crowd out trade with coastal states and provinces without having
a similar impact on the internal regions. The exporter coastal dummy also enters statistically
significant and negative, but has a much smaller magnitude. Note that the inclusion of these
coastal variables greatly reduces the magnitude of the border effect before the correction for
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market size. It could be the case that when properly correcting for coastal access, there is a
significantly smaller border effect between the United States and Canada; however, this result
could also be driven by the data-generating process resulting in the misrecording of the origin or
destination of a good. Further research is necessary to see if coastal access can explain much of
the border effect.
In column 4 of Table 7 I include the two coastal dummy variables mentioned above as well
as an interaction between these dummy variables and the border dummy to see if coastal access
impacts intranational trade differently than international trade. The first thing to note is that the
market size effect is still statistically significant and has roughly the same magnitude. Neither of
the coastal interaction terms enter with statistical significance. From this I conclude that coastal
access does not have a differing impact if trade crosses the U.S.-Canada border.
Non-linear Least Squares
Another potential concern is that the importance of importer market size on the border
effect is simply driven by misspecification. Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) have observed
that misspecifying the gravity equation as linear biases the coefficient estimates of any gravity
regression. They demonstrate that non-linear techniques, such as Poisson Quasi-Maximum
Likelihood, result in non-biased coefficient estimates. Dias (2011a) demonstrates that log-
linearizing the border effect equation results in border effect estimates that are biased upward. In
this section I estimate the impact of importer market size on the border effect using two different
non-linear estimation techniques.
Since Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), Poisson Quasi-Maximum Likelihood (PQML) has
become the preferred estimation method for any gravity equation. In Table 8, I report each of
the results of using PQML to estimate the impact of importer market size on the border effect.
Columns 4 and 5 indicate that the importer market size interaction term loses significance when
I move to a PQML estimation. However, in this specification the standard errors have become
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significantly large. For example, the standard error of the border dummy in column 5 is more
than ten times larger than the same coefficient’s standard error in column 1. Indeed, the border
effect itself seems to have disappeared! This is likely caused by multicolinearity. Because there
are significantly more intranational trade observations than international trade observations, the
border dummy variable is highly correlated with the market size interaction. As such, I interact
the market size with (1− border effect) in column 6.
The market size effect is statistically significant at the 1% level and moves in the same
direction as the log-linearized specification.9 In addition, the magnitude in the PQML estimation
is more than double that of the log-linear estimation, indicating the log-linear estimation’s
importer market size effect is a conservative estimate. It should also be noted that the sign on
the distance interaction switches signs, and is now consistent with Dias (2011a).
While PQML is the most common estimator used in the recent border effect literature, it
does have its drawbacks. Specifically, it assumes that the mean and standard deviation are equal
to each other. To be sure this is not impacting the results, I also estimate the equations using
a negative binomial estimator. These results are found in Table 9. The coefficient estimates are
nearly identical to those found in the PQML estimations.
Conclusion
The “home bias” or “border effect” puzzle has been a striking empirical oddity since
McCallum (1995). Trade economists have long attempted to explain the magnitude of the border
effect through a variety of econometric and theoretical techniques; perhaps the most successful
example is Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), which explains much of the magnitude of the
border effect as being the result of omitted variables bias.
In this paper, I demonstrate another important omitted variable in the estimation of home
bias: the importer market size’s impact on the border effect. I develop a model based on Eaton
9Because it is now interaction with (1− border effect), the negative sign is now the same as a positive sign in
the log-linear equation.
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and Kortum (2002) in which trade costs are explicitly a function of importer market size. I
then empirically demonstrate the existence of heterogeneous border effects. From these results,
I provide a mechanism, fixed costs of crossing the border, that potentially explains why larger
markets would experience a smaller border effect.
With this, I empirically estimate how the border effect is impacted by importer market
size. I find that a 10% increase in the market size of an importing country would increase trade
by 2.6% more for cross border trade, thus mitigating the border effect. In addition, importer
population density, proxying for marketing costs, also are important in determining the border
effect. I finish the paper by performing robustness checks to strengthen my result. From these
robustness checks I conclude that importer market size does in fact have a significant impact on
the border effect.
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CHAPTER III
INTERNAL TRANSPORTATION COSTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
Introduction
International trade economists have long been interested in trade costs. In recent years,
as artificial trade barriers, such as tariffs and quotas, fall to low levels, trade economists have
become more interested in transportation costs as a trade barrier. Because they are difficult to
measure, many trade models proxy for these trade costs with distances between countries. While
the distance between countries, which I call external distance, functions well as a proxy for trade
costs (and has since Tinbergen 1962), it does not give an explicit explanation of trade costs. In
addition, it fails to capture anything not correlated with external distance.
Because of this limitation, there is a significant literature that attempts to explicitly define
trade costs (see for example Anderson and van Wincoop 2004). Transportation costs can be
anything from actual shipping costs to time delays associated with shipping (Hummels and Schaur
2013) to uncertainty associated with maritime piracy (Burlando et al. 2014). The trade cost
literature includes examinations of free trade agreements (Baier and Bergstrand 2007), culture
(Rauch and Trindade 2002), historical and political costs (Head et al. 2010), and the border effect
(McCallum 1995, Anderson and van Wincoop 2003) among many others.
One potentially important trade cost that has received little attention until recently is the
costs incurred in trading before a good leaves the country of origin, which I call internal costs (see
Agnosteva et al. 2014). One probable avenue in which internal costs are important is that a firm
located in a country with high internal costs is at a competitive disadvantage compared to those
firms that can move a good through its location cheaper. While we have many estimates for the
effect of external distance on trade, we know very little about the magnitude of internal distance
as a hindrance to international trade.
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Little research has been done in this area because internal trade costs and internal distance
can be both extremely difficult to measure and difficult to estimate. No comprehensive data
set exists that allows a researcher to perfectly track the movements of a traded good within
the country of origin. To overcome this obstacle, I combine two data sets, a data set including
commodity-level exports at the U.S. port level and a data set with state-level agricultural
production, to create a unique weighted-average measure of internal distance.
The impact of internal distance on trade is difficult to estimate because it is plausible
that internal distance is endogenous to trade levels. Ceteris paribus, firms which export heavily
will tend to locate production closer to the port of export as a means of reducing internal trade
costs, biasing the estimate of the impact of internal distance. To alleviate this concern, I limit
my sample to agricultural goods, which are constrained in production location by climate and
soil factors. This allows me to use an instrumental variable strategy, where I instrument actual
agricultural production with the Food and Agricultural Organization’s (FAO) Global Agro-
Ecological Zone project’s suitability index. This index essentially ranks the ability of each state
to grow a given agricultural good. The measure is created by the FAO using historical measures of
climate and soil that are independent of U.S. trade patterns.
I find that the internal distance elasticity of trade is statistically significant and large
in magnitude, having a larger impact on trade flows than external distance. I find that, using
conservative estimates, a 10% decrease in the distance a good must travel before leaving the
United States would increase the exports of that good by 16%. These findings have potentially
significant policy implications, particularly with policy makers’ decisions to fund internal
infrastructure.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section two of this paper gives a brief review of the relevant
literature. Section three outlines the empirical specifications and section four details the data used
in this paper. Section five details the results. Section six concludes.
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Literature Review
This paper contributes to a key literature in international trade which focuses on gravity
models of trade and trade costs. Trade economists have long attempted to explain what exactly
the trade cost component in the gravity model should properly consist of. Authors have examined
the border effect, or the notion that regions are more likely to trade with other regions within
their country as compared to international regions. Examples of these papers include McCallum
(1995), which found the border effect between Canada and the U.S., Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003), which outlined the theoretical justification and an empirical methodology for properly
estimating the border effect, and Query (2014) which shows that the border effect is smaller for
importers with greater GDP. Many papers have examined the potential trade-encouraging effects
of currency and trade unions. Glick and Rose (2002) finds that joining a currency union nearly
doubles trade between the sharing countries. Head et al. (2010) finds that strong colonial ties
can boost trade. Blonigen and Wilson (2008) and Clark et al. (2004) show that the efficiency of
a country’s ports significantly impact trade. Most gravity-based papers examine between-country
trade costs. In this paper, I further attempt to understand how trade costs drive trade flows, but I
am examining the costs a trading firm incurs before a good leaves the country.
Two papers that are directly related to this paper are Agnosteva et al. (2014) and Cosar
and Fajgelbam (2014). A recent paper, Agnosteva et al. (2014) outlines a methodology for
measuring intra-national border barriers and intra-regional trade costs. The paper finds that
intra-regional trade costs are an important consideration in conducting comparative statics.
The paper notes the importance of future research “exploring the connection between intra-
regional and inter-regional trade costs.” Cosar and Fajgelbaum (2014) develops a model which
demonstrates that costly trade leads production to move to areas with easy access to foreign
ports. Reduction in trade costs results in migration to coastal areas. This finding is supported
with data showing that U.S. export-oriented industries are more likely to be located near
international ports. This finding is important to the endogeneity discussion in this paper.
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Many previous papers examined internal distance, but these papers typically refer to how
far a good bought and sold in the same country travels; they do not consider the effect on related
international trade flows. For a discussion of how various papers measure this type of internal
distance, see Head and Mayer (2002). A few papers do examine internal distance in a similar
fashion to this paper. Blonigen and Wilson (2006) estimates a gravity model which includes
inland transport prices, as well as inland transport distances, though the latter is included in
a market potential variable so no direct internal distance elasticity is estimated. Malchow and
Kanafani (2004) uses the distance a good would have to travel before leaving a port to estimate
the internal distances effect on port choice, though the paper does not look at trade level effects.
While containing no direct measure of distance, Volpe Martincus and Blyde (2013) finds that
firms in Chile which experienced a shock to their transportation network saw a decrease in
the total value of exports. However, because this paper does not contain a measure of internal
distance it does not estimate an internal distance elasticity. Cosar and Demir (2014) uses internal
distance measures to calculate the remoteness of Turkish provinces. The authors demonstrate that
improved road infrastructure results in increased trade levels. Atkin and Donaldson (2014) uses
price gaps to show that intranational trade costs are significantly larger in Ethiopia and Nigeria
than in the United States. For a review of literature related to transportation infrastructure, see
Redding and Turner (2014).
Empirical Methodology
Gravity Model
The model used to econometrically estimate the elasticities associated with internal
and external distance is the gravity model of trade pioneered by Tinbergen (1962) and given
theoretical justification by Anderson (1979). The typical log-linearized specification for trade is
given by:
lnXijk = β1 + β2 lnYi + β3 lnYj + β4Zijk + αi + αj + αk + ijk (3.1)
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where Xijk is the trade in product k exported by country i to country j, Yi is the GDP of country
i, Zijk is a vector of explanatory variables, αi, αj , and αk are importer, exporter, and product
fixed effects, and ijk is an i.i.d. error term with mean zero and variance one. As outlined in in
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), this specification should include multilateral resistance terms
for both the importer and exporter, which Feenstra (2002) shows can be accounted for using
importer and exporter fixed effects. Theoretically, β2 and β3 should be equal to one.
1 As such, the
gravity equation can be rewritten as:
ln
Xijk
YiYj
= β1 + β4Zijk + αi + αj + αk + ijk (3.2)
Variables often included in Zijk are the distance between i and j, whether i and j share a
common language, whether i and j border each other, and whether i and j share a common
colonial tie. For this paper, I include the distance between country i and j as well as adding a
new variable, the distance good k travels within country i before being exported to country j.
There are a few complications that lead to modifications of equation 3.2 for my data
set. First, because the only exporter in my data set is the United States, Yi and αi cannot be
seperarely identified from the regression’s constant.2 In addition, because the external distance
between the United States and a given country is fixed, I cannot include both a measure of
external distance and the importer fixed effect αj . To allow for a comparison of the magnitude
between internal and external distance elasticities, I will exclude αj from my specifications. This
could lead to a potential bias in my specification, as the importer multilateral resistance term is
not fully accounted for and is potentially correlated with included variables. In addition, I allow
the importer income elasticity of trade to differ from one.
1However, as noted in my result section, when I allow the income elasticity to differ from one, I find an income
elasticity significantly lower than one.
2The main importance of the exporter fixed effect is to account for country specific effects including that
country’s multilateral resistance term, but because there is only one exporter, this fixed effect simply gets subsumed
into the constant without generating any bias.
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One potential issue with omitting importer fixed effects is that importer-specific factors
that impact trade which are typically subsumed into the importer fixed effect are not accounted
for.3 These omitted variables are unlikely to be correlated with internal distance but may bias
coefficient estimates, especially with regards to external distance. As a result, the regressions I
estimate in this paper will be a variation of the following equation:
lnXjk = β1 + β2 lnYj + β3 lnEXTDISTj + β4 ln INTDISTjk + β5COMLANGj (3.3)
+β6AREAj + β7COMCURRj + β8RTAj + β9CONTIGj + αk + jk
where Xjk is the value of commodity k exported from the United States to country j, Yj is
the GDP of country j, EXTDISTj is the external distance between the United States and
country j, INTDISTjk is the internal distance of commodity k before being exported to country
j, COMLANGj is a dummy variable indicating if the United States and country j share an
official language, AREAj is the geographic area of country j, COMCURRj is a dummy variable
taking the value of one if the United States and country j share a common currency, RTAj is a
dummy variable indicating if the United States and country j are in a regional trade agreement,
CONTIGj is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the United States and country j have a
contiguous border, and αk is a commodity fixed effect.
Accounting for Production Location Endogeneity
Within-country distance is likely endogenous. It is possible that producers, at least to
some extent, locate their production as close to their customers as is feasible. Thus, producers
of exported commodities likely move closer to the coasts, limiting the within-country distance
traveled (see, for example, Cosar and Fajgelbaum 2014). To accommodate for this potential
endogeneity, I limit my data to agricultural goods. Because of the nature of agricultural goods,
3Any U.S.-specific trade determinants will be in the constant term β1 as the U.S. is the only exporter.
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production is limited to a specific area where the climate and soil are suited for growing a crop.
As such, agricultural goods are less likely to be subject to this endogeneity concern.
Measuring the distance a good travels within the exporting country before leaving a port
is difficult. One potential problem is that a given good-importer pair will almost certainly not
originate from the same location. Countries that import corn may get corn from both Indiana and
Iowa, for example. In addition, many goods travel through multiple ports for the same importer.
Of the 1,175 country-commodity pairs available in my port trade data set, a mere 421 go through
only one port. The mean number of ports a country-commodity pair goes through is 3.7, and the
most ports a commodity-pair goes through is 48, which is corn to Canada. As a non-Canadian
example, Japan’s imports of soybeans went through 28 different U.S. ports in 2007.
In this paper, I generate a measure of the internal distance of agricultural goods for a given
importer. Due to data limitations, this measure is limited to exports from the United States. I
use state shares of agricultural production, as well as port shares in agricultural exports to a given
importer, to generate a weighted average of all distances a good can travel before leaving the
United States for its final destination. The measure of internal distance for a given commodity
and importer pair, INTDISTjk, is given by:
INTDISTjk =
∑
s
∑
p
Xjkp∑
p′ Xjkp′
Pks∑
s′ Pks′
dsp (3.4)
where j is the importer, k is the commodity, s is a given state, p is a given port, Xjkp is country
j’s imports of commodity k through port p, Pks is the total production of commodity k in state
s, and dsp is the distance from state s to port p. By constructing a weighted average measure
of internal distance, I place a higher importance on ports frequently used for a given importer-
commodity pair and place little weight on infrequently used ports. In addition, I place a higher
weight on states with larger volumes of production of a given commodity and little weight on
states that grow very little.
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Table 7 includes summary statistics for INTDISTjk by commodity. Because the United
States is one of the largest countries in the world, by area, it is not surprising to see such large
internal distances for the U.S. Only one good (Tobacco) travels less than 1000 miles, on average,
to a port before being shipped to a country. Tomatoes and Potatoes tend to travel the furthest
within the United States before being exported.
This measure is still subject to endogeneity concerns. Specifically, it could be the case
that crop production locations are determined by the trade demand for these goods. Producers
potentially choose to grow crops as close as possible to the ports their crops will ship through,
even if that location is not the most ideal location for production. To correct for this possible
endogeneity, I create an instrument for INTDISTjk, IVjk, which uses the FAO Global Agro-
Ecological Zone project’s crop suitability index to instrument for actual state agricultural
production. The suitability index uses comprehensive soil and climate data to determine how
suitable the land of a given U.S. state is for growing a given crop. Further details on construction
of this index are in the data section of this paper. The crop suitability index is based only a
state’s climate and soil conditions and thus is independent of the trade process. Thus, I construct
IVjk as follows:
IVjk =
∑
s
∑
p
Xjkp∑
p′ Xjkp′
PPks∑
s′ PPks′
dsp (3.5)
where all variables previously described are the same and PPks is the crop suitability from the
Global Agro-Ecological Zone project. This measure is used to instrument for INTDISTjk in a
two-stage least squares process.
Data
The data used in this paper come from a variety of sources. The trade data come from
the UN Comtrade database. Comtrade provides trade data for a variety of years and levels of
aggregation. In this paper, I use 4-digit harmonized system 2007 data for the year 2007 and 4-
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digit harmonized system 1992 data for years 1992, 1997, 2002, and 2007.4 The Comtrade data
does not report which port a good went through, information that is necessary in constructing my
internal distance measure. To handle this, I use the U.S. port to foreign country trade data for the
year 2007 available from the U.S. Census Bureau’s USA Trade Online, which is provided at the
4-digit harmonized system level.
Agricultural data comes from two main sources. Actual agricultural production for the U.S.
comes from the 2007 Agricultural Census. The Agricultural Census has total production by state
for the agricultural products listed in Table 8. A measure of how good a state is at producing
a crop, the crop suitability index, comes from the Food and Agricultural Organization Global
Agro-Ecological Zone (GAEZ). The crop suitability index is a value between zero and one hundred
and is derived from the GAEZ model which estimates the potential crop yield of each state’s
land using average climate data from 1961 to 1990 as well as data on soil resources and terrain-
slope conditions. The index is estimated separately for differing input levels as well as source
of water. In this paper, I use the intermediate input level, rain fed suitability index. The FAO
GAEZ data have previously been used by Costinot and Donaldson (2011), using both actual
and potential production of agricultural goods to measure gains from economic integration. In
addition, it was used in Nunn and Qian (2011) to estimate the potential productivity of potatoes
in Europe, allowing them to estimate the impact of potatoes on population growth.
State-to-port distances are calculated “as the crow flies,” using data on longtitude and
latitude coordinates for each state and port. The location data for each state comes from Google
Maps,5 and is measured at the center of the city with the largest population according to the 2000
U.S. Census. Port location data comes from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ Navigation Data
Center6. Gravity variables come from the CEPII Gravity dataset (see Head et al. 2010).
4For most specifications, I use the HS2007 data as it is the most detailed data available in 2007. Unfortunately,
HS2007 data does not exist prior to 2007, so for the year-by-year comparison I use HS1992 even for the 2007
estimation.
5Found using http://www.mapcoordinates.net/en.
6The data can be found at http://www.navigationdatacenter.us/ports/ports.asp.
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Results
Internal Distance Elasticity
To generate estimates of the various distance elasticities, I estimate variations of equation
3.3 using basic OLS and the IV strategy outlined above. Table 9 reports these estimations using
the HS2007 data for the year 2007. Column one is equation 3.3 estimated using the variable
INTDISTjk without any instrumental or control variables, while column two excludes control
variables but uses 2SLS to instrument for INTDISTjk with IVjk. Column three adds the
importer-specific control variables using OLS. Column four uses both importer-specific controls
and the IV strategy.
Both columns one and two have an external distance elasticity near unity in magnitude.
The distance elasticity of trade being close to one makes intuitive sense, but this result is not
often found in empirical estimations. Columns three and four have an external distance elasticity
between -0.445 and -0.465, smaller in magnitude than the results in column one and two. This
indicates that while transportation costs have a significant impact on trade, costs other than
transportation costs such as ease of communication (proxied for by the common language dummy)
also have a significant impact on trade and are highly correlated with between-country distance.
As expected, the contiguity dummy is large in magnitude, though it is only statistically significant
in the IV regression. The regional trade agreement dummy is statistically significant and large in
magnitude in both regressions. The other control variables are not statistically significant in either
specification.
In all specifications, the coefficient on the log of internal distance is negative, ranging from
-1.669 to -2.002, and of a larger magnitude than external distance, which ranges from -0.445 to
-1.068. The last row of Table 9 reports the p-value of the test that the coefficient on internal
distance is equal to the coefficient on external distance. In my most-preferred specification which
is reported in column four, I can reject that the internal distance elasticity is equal to the external
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distance elasticity at the 5% significance level. A 10% decrease in internal distance would cause a
16-20% increase in trade. This effect is similar to, and potentially larger than, the positive impact
on trade than a 10% decrease in the distance between countries, which would only increase trade
by 4%-11%.
Because EXTDISTj is simply a measure of distance between two points while
INTDISTjk is a weighted average measure of distances, I report the standardized coefficients
for the regressions in Table 10. Using column four as an example, these results say that a
one standard deviation decrease in internal distance will increase trade in a given product
by 0.23 standard deviations; a one standard deviation decrease in external distance will only
increase trade by 0.08 standard deviations. The results here are similar to those of Table 9.
The standardized coefficients on internal distance are always larger in magnitude than the
standardized coefficients on external distance.
This result has potentially important policy implications. Artificial trade barriers, such as
tariffs and quotas, are becoming less relevant given that policies such as free trade agreements
push these barriers toward zero. As such, if policy makers look to reducing non-artificial barriers
as a means to promote trade, these results indicate that internal trade costs are a potentially
fruitful avenue for policy makers to pursue. Not only will improving domestic trade infrastructure
be an effective tool in trade promotion, it also creates important externalities for the country. A
more efficient transportation network in the United States will not only have a strong impact on
the U.S.’s international trade but will also encourage more domestic trade. In addition, domestic
investment is more politically palatable than “international” investment.
Finally, Table 9 shows an income elasticity of trade that is different from the one dictated
by theory. In fact, the income elasticity of trade is around 0.55 in Table 9. This pattern also holds
true in Table 11. While the income elasticity of trade varies year-by-year, going as low as 0.44 in
1992, it hovers around the 0.55 mark for most years and is never close to one.
37
I now use the potential production index to generate IV estimates. The first-stage F-stat
for the instrumental variable is reported in columns 2 and 4. The F-stat is greater than 400, a
strong indication that my instrument is correlated with internal distance. The difference between
columns one and two and the difference between columns three and four are both negligible. The
IV-estimated coefficient is always within one standard deviation of the OLS estimation. The
similarity between the OLS and IV estimates is evidence that farmers are not locating their farms
based on distance to the port of export. Instead, they are potentially choosing production location
based on some other factors, such as soil and climate quality or distance to domestic customers.
Internal Distance Over Time
One natural question that comes from this result is: does this result hold for years besides
2007? To test this, I estimate equation 3.3 using HS1992 data for the years 1992, 1997, 2002, and
2007.7 These results can be found in Table 11. For the years 1992 and 2007, the trade elasticity of
internal distance is about 1.5-1.6%, similar to those found in Table 9. In magnitude, the internal
distance elasticity is statistically significant and greater than the external distance elasticity for all
years, though the degrees to which they are different vary greatly. For 1992, the coefficients on the
two distance measures are different at almost the 90% confidence level while for the years 1997,
2002, and 2007 the coefficients on internal and external distance do not appear to be significantly
different. This indicates that international trade is indeed as responsive, if not more responsive, to
internal distance than external distance.
Table 11 has another interesting result to note. The external distance elasticity was
significantly smaller in 1992 than it is in 2007. In fact, external distance in 1992 has less than
half the impact it does in 2007. In addition, the impact of external distance is monotonically
increasing in time. A plausible explanation for this result could be the tendency of the United
States to move towards exporting those agricultural goods which cost more to ship via boat. This
7Note that this means the 2007 results in Table 9, which uses HS2007 instead of HS1992 data, and Table 11 will
differ.
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result is consistent with the finding in Head and Mayer (2000) which shows that external distance
effects have either increased, or remained constant, throughout time.
Conclusion
In this paper, I estimate the elasticity of trade associated with transportation costs that
occur within the exporting county. I accomplish this by generating a measure of the distance
various goods must travel to a port before being exported. I find that trade barriers occuring
within the exporting country have a significant impact on trade flows; the impact of these barriers
are potentially more important than external trade barriers.
In order to properly estimate the internal distance elasticity of trade, I combine multiple
data sets to arrive at a weighted average measure of the distance a good must travel before
leaving the United States. I use state production values and port export data to get an estimate
of internal distance. I then include this estimate in a gravity model of trade as a proxy for
intranational trade costs.
The location of production for a good may be endogenous to trade levels. I accommodate
this potential endogeneity in two key ways. First, I limit my sample to only include agricultural
products. Because agricultural products need the correct soil and climate conditions to grow,
producers have less options when it comes to production location. To further alleviate this, I use
the potential of state land to grow a good as an instrument for actual state production.
I find that internal distance is statistically significant and large in magnitude. In my most
conservative estimate, a 10% reduction in internal distance would result in a 16.49% increase
in international trade. The IV regression coefficients are similar in magnitude to their OLS
counterparts. As such, there is no evidence that agricultural producers are selecting their farm
locations based on their international trading partners.
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CHAPTER IV
TRADE CREATION AND TRADE DIVERSION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: DO LARGER
COUNTRIES BENEFIT MORE?
Introduction
Regional trade agreements, including free trade agreements and customs unions, have
increasingly been used to encourage trade between member countries. Perhaps no regional trade
agreement has shaped international trade patterns more than the European Union (E.U.). The
E.U. is the largest economy in the world. In addition it goes further than most regional trade
agreements, having a currency union and allowing for the free movement of labor between many
member nations.
Since the formation of regional trade agreements (RTAs) people have been studying their
effects. Viner (1950) first introduced two major outcomes of joining an RTA: the concepts of trade
creation and trade diversion. Trade creation is the idea that after joining an RTA, two member
countries will trade more with each other. Trade diversion is the idea that member countries will
trade less with non-member countries. Typically, trade is being diverted from more efficient non-
member countries to less efficient member countries because lower trade barriers between member
countries results in a cheaper price despite inefficiencies in production.
In this paper, I contribute to the trade creation and trade diversion literature by
demonstrating that the costs and benefits of joining the E.U. are heterogeneous across member
nations and, as such, previous estimations of the average effect fail to tell the complete story. I
estimate the trade creation and trade diversion effects for each country that joined the European
Union between the years 1962 and 2010 and show that these effects differ from country to country.
Furthermore, I demonstrate a variety of causes for this heterogeneity in trade creation and trade
diversion effects. I provide strong evidence that the economic size of a member nation is a key
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component of trade creation and trade diversion heterogeneity. Economically larger E.U. members
face smaller trade creation and trade diversion effects; they continue to trade extensively with
non-E.U. members. On the other hand, smaller countries become more dependent on other
E.U. members, importing less from and exporting less to non-E.U. members. Certain country
groups also see heterogeneous effects. On average, countries see a 26% jump in trade with other
E.U. members upon joining the E.U. Similarly, they see a 13.8% decrease in trade with non-E.U.
members. Scandinavian countries, however, see smaller trade creation and trade diversion effects
than the E.U. average. Interestingly, former Eastern Bloc countries see an increase in trade with
E.U. members of 150%, resulting in a trade creation effect that is significantly higher than the
E.U. average. In addition, rather than seeing a decrease in trade with non-E.U. members, Eastern
Bloc countries actually increase their trade with non-E.U. members.
This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I briefly review the related trade
creation and trade diversion literature. In section three I outline the model to be estimated.
Section four describes the data used in this paper and section five describes the results. Section
six concludes.
Literature Review
This paper contributes to three key literatures: the regional trade agreement literature, the
related trade creation and trade diversion literature, and the border effect of trade literature. This
paper addresses various aspects of all three literatures while also adding to each.
A sizable literature exists which uses the gravity model of trade to estimate the impact of
regional trade agreements on bilateral trade levels. Head et al. (2010) includes a regional trade
agreement dummy in the gravity equation and finds that trade is greater for two RTA members
than for similar nonmembers. Several papers have included a dummy variable for currency unions
in the gravity model, including Rose (2000) and Nitsch (2002). Both find that a currency union
increases trade, though Nitsch’s effect is half that of Rose’s. Haveman and Hummels (1998) find
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that RTAs can divert trade away from member countries and they can increase trade for non-
member countries.
A related literature examines the endogenous process of joining an RTA. Baier and
Bergstrand (2004) find that key determinants of joining an RTA include distance between
countries, remoteness of partners from the rest of the world, the economic size of the trading
partners, and the proximity of the trading partners. However, to my knowledge, no paper dealing
with the trade creation or diversion associated with an RTA has examined heterogeneous benefits
of RTAs as I do in this paper. In addition, Baier and Bergstrand (2007) show that the most
appropriate method for handling this endogeneity is doing a panel approach with bilateral and
time fixed effects; I follow their methodology in this paper.
A significant literature exists examining the trade creation and trade diversion effects of
regional trade agreements. Viner (1950) first introduced the concepts of trade creation and trade
diversion. These concepts have been expanded on heavily in the last half century. Panagariya
(2000) is a detailed survey of the theoretical literature dealing with trade creation and trade
diversion. A recent paper estimating these two effects is Magee (2008), which uses fixed effects in
a gravity model to control for the “natural trading partner” hypothesis introduced by Wonnacott
and Lutz (1989) and Krugman (1991). This hypothesis states that partners which previously
had large trade levels are more likely to enter into a regional trade agreement. I deal with this
“natural trading partner” problem by only examining the overall increase in trade during the
period following joining an RTA. Magee (2008) finds that regional trade agreements have a
significant impact on trade both before joining the RTA (“anticipatory effects”) and for several
years after joining. This implies that my estimation results are lower bounds of the trade creation
and trade diversion effects.
Lastly, this paper is related to the literature concerning the border effect, or home bias,
of trade. The idea that, controlling for relevant variables, two regions within a country are
significantly more likely to trade with each other than with international regions was introduced
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by McCallum (1995) and expanded on by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) among others.1
One border effect paper of particular relevance is Nitsch (2000). Nitsch finds that the border
effect exists among E.U. members; despite the E.U.’s goal of economic integration, E.U. members
are ten times more likely to trade with themselves than with other E.U. members. Nitsch also
finds that countries with a larger per-capita GDP have smaller border effects. Chen (2004) also
finds border effects among E.U. members and demonstrates that technical barriers to trade and
information costs can explain these border effects. Of note is that both of these papers examine
the country-level border effect rather than a “European Union Border effect.” I treat the E.U.
as one country to estimate the border effect and then further estimate how economic size may
impact the magnitude of the border effect using an idea similar to Query (2014).
Model
This paper uses the gravity model of trade, outlined in Tinbergen (1962), to estimate the
impact of joining the European Union on international trade levels. In addition, I follow the
methodology of Baier and Bergstrand (2007) and include importer-exporter and time fixed effects.
The typical gravity model can then be written as:
lnXijt = β1 + β2 lnGDPit + β3 lnGDPjt + β4 lnGDPPCit + β5 lnGDPPCjt+ (4.1)
β6Zijt + αij + αt + ijt
where Xijt is the trade from exporter i to importer j in year t, GDPi is the gross domestic
product of country i, GDPPCi is the GDP-per-capita of country i, Zijt is a vector of ijt specific
variables, αij are importer-exporter fixed effects, and αt is a time fixed effect.
1A non-exhaustive list includes Wolf (2000), Feenstra (2002), Hillberry and Hummels (2003), and Wolf (2005).
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Trade Creation and Trade Diversion
To estimate the trade creation and trade diversion effects of joining the E.U., I modify
equation 4.1 to include a set of variables related to a country’s relative status to the E.U. This
results in the following equation:
lnXijt = β1 + β2 lnGDPit + β3 lnGDPjt + β4 lnGDPPCjt + β5 lnGDPPCjt+ (4.2)
β6EUEUijt + β7EUNONEUijt + β8EUROEUROijt + αij + αt + ijt
where EUEUijt is a dummy variable equal to one if both i and j are members of the E.U. in year
t EUNONEU is equal to one if one country is a member of the E.U. in year t and the other is
not, and EUROEUROijt is equal to one of both countries are members of the Eurozone in year
t. The coefficient β6 represents the average percentage trade created between two members by
joining the E.U. and β7 is the average percentage trade decrease, or diversion, from non-E.U.
members which is caused by joining the E.U. As such, theory dictates that β6 should be positive
and β7 should be negative.
Heterogeneity in Trade Creation and Trade Diversion
Equation 4.2 estimates the average trade creation and trade diversion effects of the E.U.
However, there is no reason to suspect that the European Union impacts each member in the
same way. For example, Query (2014) indicates that trade barriers can impact economically-
smaller regions differently than their economically-larger counterparts. The paper argues that
fixed costs of crossing the border result in smaller per-unit costs in larger importing regions.
In addition, the paper argues that easy of marketing to larger regions may be a factor. In this
paper, I demonstrate heterogeneity in the trade creation and trade diversion effects and then
examine multiple causes of this heterogeneity. I expect to see larger E.U. members to see smaller
trade diversion effects. Large E.U. members are likely to be competitive enough to overcome
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the extra trade barrier created when joining the E.U. On the other hand, smaller E.U. members
may struggle to overcome the E.U. border effect and, as such, will become reliant on large E.U.
members as their main trading partners.
To demonstrate heterogeneity in the trade creation and diversion effects of the European
Union, I estimate the trade creation and trade diversion effects for each country that joined the
E.U. during my sample. Thus, I estimate equation 4.2 for each member country, requiring either i
or j to be the country of interest.
Having demonstrated heterogeneity in trade creation and diversion caused by the E.U., I
explore multiple potential causes of this heterogeneity. Following Query (2014), I explore the idea
that the trade creation and diversion effects of the E.U. may be a function of economic size. Thus,
I estimate the following equation:
lnXijt = β1 + β2 lnGDPit + β3 lnGDPjt + β4 lnGDPPCjt + β5 lnGDPPCjt+ (4.3)
β6EUEUijt + β7EUNONEUijt + β8EUROEUROijt + β9EUEUijt ×GDPi
+β10EUNONEUijt ×GDPi + β11EUEUijt ×GDPj + β12EUNONEUijt ×GDPj+
αij + αt + ijt
Query (2014) suggests that β10 and β12 would be negative if E.U. member countries face the
“border effect” in the same way as U.S. states and Canadian provinces, though this need not be
true. Query (2014) offers no suggestion on the the sign of either β9 or β11.
In addition, I explore the possibility that natural country groups may experience trade
creation and trade diversion differently. I first explore the idea that Eastern Bloc countries
experience trade creation and trade diversion in a manner different than that of the rest of the
E.U. Strong influence from the Soviet Union meant this countries emerged from communism to
embrace capitalist markets during my sample. As such, they are likely to experience economic
shocks differently than other E.U. members. Next, I examine whether Scandinavian and non-
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Scandinavian states see differing effects of joining the E.U. I suspect these countries may be
different than other E.U. members because of the seeming opposition to the E.U. in Scandinavia.
Norway has not joined the E.U. and neither Sweden or Denmark have joined the Eurozone. The
equation used for these estimations is equation 4.2 but requiring that either i or j be a member of
the relevant group of countries.
Data
The trade data used in this paper comes from the UN Comtrade database. Comtrade
contains imports and exports between partners for many years and varying degrees of dis-
aggregation. For this paper, I use the Comtrade data at the SITC Rev.1 level. I then aggregate
this data to arrive at total importer-exporter trade. This allows me to create a panel from 1962 to
2010. Trade values are adjusted to constant-value using the Consumer Price Index with 1982-1984
as the base year. The CPI comes from FRED.
Unfortunately, this dataset reports Belgium and Luxembourg as one country from 1962
to 1998 and as separate countries from 1999 on. I leave Luxembourg and Belgium as separate
observations from 1999 on to allow for the possibility that smaller countries like Luxembourg face
larger border effects. In addition, I drop East Germany from my specification and treat pre-1991
West Germany as the same country as post-1991 Germany.2
Dates for when each country joined the European Union and the Eurozone were retrieved
from the European Union’s official website. Purchasing-power parity adjusted gross domestic
product and country population come from the Penn World Table and cover the entire panel from
1962 to 2010.
My observations are at the importer-exporter-year level. The countries that join the E.U.
during my sample, and thus are the source of variation in my specifications, are Austria, Bulgaria,
Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia,
2This details are mentioned for clarity but do not have a significant impact on the empirics present in this
paper.
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Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom. For each of these countries, I have created regression discontinuity graphs on total
trade before and after joining the European Union. That is, I regressed the following equation on
two different time periods for each country that joins the E.U. in my sample, all years before a
country joined the European Union and all years after:
Xit = α+ βt+ it (4.4)
These graphs can be found in Figures 4 through 14.
Results
This section reports the results of the regressions mentioned in the Empirical Model
section. I begin by estimating the trade creation and trade diversion effects of being a European
Union member. I then individually estimate the trade creation and trade diversion effect
individually for each member state to demonstrate heterogeneous effects. Finally, I investigate
potential causes for this heterogeneity.
Trade Creation and Trade Diversion
Column 1 of Table 12 reports the estimation of equation 4.2. The results are as expected.
A positive coefficient on the E.U. to E.U. trade dummy indicates E.U. member states trade more
with each other than two comparable non-E.U. member countries. This is the trade creation
effect of the E.U. Similarly, a negative coefficient on the E.U./non-E.U. trade dummy means that
E.U. member states tend to trade less with non-E.U. members than two comparable non-E.U.
members. This is the trade diversion effect.
The trade creation coefficient is positive and statistically significant at the 99% confidence
level and the magnitude is economically significant. E.U. to E.U. trade is 26% larger than non-
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E.U. to non-E.U. trade.3 It is worth noting that this effect is significantly smaller than the border
effect between the U.S. and Canada, which is closer to 300%.4 However, the border effect within
the E.U. may still be as large as that seen in the U.S.-Canada border effect literature. The trade
diversion coefficient is negative and statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. E.U.
member states trade 13.8% less with non-E.U. members than you would see from two comparable
non-E.U. members.5 This effect is economically significant but smaller than the trade creation
effect.
Another result worth noting from column 1 of Table 12 is that the coefficient on the Euro
to Euro trade dummy is not statistically significant. This is evidence that, after controlling for
time and importer-exporter fixed effect, being in the Eurozone does not have trade creation effects
above and beyond that which a member state could expect from being in the European Union.
Individual Trade Creation and Trade Diversion Effects
Column 1 of Table 12 reports the average trade creation and trade diversion effects, but
there is no reason to assume the impact the E.U. has on member nations is uniform. In Table
13 I report the individually estimated trade creation and trade diversion effects as well as their
standard errors. Column 1 of Table 13 reports the coefficient on E.U. to E.U. trade for each
individual country and column 2 reports the standard error for that estimate. Column 3 reports
the individually estimated E.U. to non-E.U. coefficient and column 4 reports that coefficient’s
standard error.
Table 13 shows considerable heterogeneity in the effects of joining the European Union.
Interestingly, only Hungary and Romania have coefficients with the same sign as the average.
Every other country has either a positive coefficient on both variables of interest or a negative
3e0.234 − 1
4See Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and Feenstra (2002) for estimates of U.S-Canada border effect size.
5e−.149 − 1
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coefficient on both variables. That is, while on average there is a positive cofficient for E.U.
to E.U. trade and a negative coefficient for E.U. to non-E.U. trade, for most individual E.U.
members either trade with both E.U. countries and non-E.U. countries rose or trade with both
E.U. and non-E.U. countries fell. Countries which saw trade with both E.U. and non-E.U.
countries rise include Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.
Cyprus, Ireland, and the United Kingdom have positive coefficients on both the E.U. to E.U.
and E.U. to non-E.U. coefficients; however, the E.U. to non-E.U. coefficient is not statistically
significant. Neither coefficient is statistically significant for the Czech Republic and Finland.
Several countries see trade decrease both with E.U. countries and non-E.U. countries
on average. For Greece, Lithuania, and Spain, both coefficients are negative and statistically
significant. This implies that for these countries joining the European Union unequivocally
decreased trade. Austria, Portugal, and Sweden have negative and statistically significant
coefficients on E.U. to non-E.U. trade; their E.U. to E.U. coefficient is negative but not
statistically significant. They appear to see trade diversion from non-E.U. members while failing
to see the trade creation effect of the E.U.
A few interesting patterns emerge from this analysis. Both countries that saw the same
coefficients as the average members are from the Eastern Bloc. In addition, it is worth noting
that five of the nine Eastern Bloc countries are included in this group. In fact, the only Eastern
Bloc country that has a negative and statistically significant coefficient on E.U. to E.U. trade is
Lithuania. The European Union seems to have been a significant boost to trade for the Eastern
Bloc. In addition, the two Scandinavian countries that are E.U. members are Denmark and
Sweden. Denmark saw trade rise with both E.U. and non-E.U. members after joining the E.U.
Sweden, however, saw the negative trade diversion effect with no corresponding trade creation
effect. Despite both being Scandinavian countries, they see vastly differing effects of the European
Union. I explore heterogeneity among nation groups later in this paper.
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Market Size
Given the established heterogeneity in the effect of joining the E.U., I now turn to various
explanations of this heterogeneity. I first examine the “market size effect” documented in Query
(2014). Column 2 of table 12 reports the results for the estimation of equation 4.3. The negative
coefficient on the interaction of importer GDP and the E.U. to E.U. trade dummy indicates that
larger E.U. members see a smaller increase in imports from other E.U. countries. One explanation
for this is that larger countries face a smaller barrier to trade with non-E.U. countries and as
such divert less trade from non-E.U. to E.U. members. The negative coefficient on the interaction
between exporter GDP and the E.U. to E.U. dummy says that larger E.U. members also divert
a smaller fraction of their exports to E.U. members. These two results imply that smaller E.U.
members become reliant on larger E.U. members as they both import and export more heavily
from E.U. members than their larger counterparts, while the larger E.U. members continue to
trade heavily with outside countries.
Another interesting result reported in column 2 of table 12 is the negative coefficient on the
interaction of importer GDP and the E.U. to non E.U. dummy. This goes against the results of
Query (2014) and says that smaller E.U. members see a smaller decrease in non-E.U. trade than
their larger counterparts. A potential explanation for this is that, all else equal, simply joining
the European Union makes a country a more attractive trading partner. This could be because of
implied financial stability, confidence in the reliability of courts and laws, or the ease of extending
trading networks from one E.U. country to another. This result alleviates some of the reliance on
larger E.U. countries for imports as mentioned above. Exporter GDP does not appear to have an
effect on the diversion of exports from non-E.U. to E.U. countries.
Heterogeneous Effects for Differing Nation Groups
Another potential source of heterogeneity is that joining the E.U. impacts groups of nations
differently. Column 3 of Table 12 reports the results for only the Eastern Bloc countries, all of
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which are members of the European Union.6 Note that the coefficient on E.U. to E.U. trade is
statistically significant at the 99% confidence level and is of a magnitude larger than the average
E.U. to E.U. effect. Eastern Bloc countries see an increase in trade with other E.U. members of
more than 150%.7 This is both statstically and economically significantly different than the 26%
average effect. Not only is the trade creation effect for Eastern Bloc countries higher, but the
coefficient on E.U. to non-E.U. trade is positive and statistically significant. Rather than diverting
trade from non-E.U. countries, the Eastern Bloc countries actually increased trade with non-E.U.
countries after joining the E.U.
These results suggests that the Eastern Bloc countries unequivocally benefit from
joining the E.U. One potential explanation for this result is that, as mentioned previously, E.U.
membership itself acts as a signal of consistent and predictable economic and monetary stability.
Another potential explanation is that Eastern European countries function as export platforms
for the European Union, with significant FDI taking place in these countries due to their E.U.
membership and low wages.
Finally it is important to note that while on average the adoption of Euro has no effect
on trade, for the Eastern Block countries which adopted the Euro the Euro has a positive,
statistically significant, and economically significant impact on trade. The Eastern Bloc countries
trade 42% more with other Eurozone members than with non-Eurozone E.U. countries.8
Column 4 of Table 12 shows the impact of the European Union on Scandinavian countries.9
Unlike the Eastern Bloc, which had all members join the E.U., not all Scandinavian countries
are E.U. members. Norway is not an E.U. member and does not participate in the customs
union, though they do participate in the European Economic Area. No Scandinavian country
6These countries are Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and
Slovakia.
7This number is equal to 1− e.938.
8This number is equal to 1− e.348.
9These countries are Norway, Denmark, and Sweden.
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participates in the Eurozone. The Scandinavian countries see the same signs on all major
coefficients though with smaller magnitudes. The Scandinavian countries see a trade creation
effect of approximately 20%10 and a trade diversion effect of only -8%.11 The trade creation effect
is only statistically significant at the 90% confidence level and the trade diversion effect is not
statistically significant.
Conclusion
Fully understanding the effects of regional trade agreements is important for examining
their usefulness as trade creation policies. International trade economists have been examining the
impact of RTAs on trade, most often estimating the average trade creation and trade diversion
effects of joining an RTA. Key amongst this research is an examination of the impact of the
largest regional trade agreement, the European Union.
In this paper, I show that estimating the average trade creation and trade diversion effects
of the European Union is not sufficient for understanding if joining the E.U. is beneficial for a
country. I individually estimate the trade creation and trade diversion effects of the E.U. and
demonstrate that these effects differ from country to country. I then explore multiple causes of
this heterogeneity. Larger E.U. members see less trade creation and less trade diversion, while
smaller members become more reliant on other E.U. members for trade. In addition, Scandinavian
countries see smaller trade creation and trade diversion effects while Eastern Bloc countries see
larger trade creation effects while also increasing trade with non-E.U. members. To understand if
joining the E.U. is beneficial for a country, one must consider the whole picture.
10This number is equal to 1− e.187.
11This number is equal to 1− e−.079.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
International trade is welfare creating. As such, policy makers constantly seek to increase
international trade levels. As free trade agreements bring tariff levels ever close to zero worldwide,
the policy instruments available to these policy makers shrink. This dissertation examines non-
tariff trade barriers, diving below the surface and seeking to fully understand how these implicit
trade costs impact international trade levels. In doing so, this dissertation allows policy makers to
make a better-informed decision. I have outlined three major contributions to the understanding
of how non-tariff trade costs impact international trade.
The first key contribution of this dissertation is the examination of how the border effect is
a function of importer market size. While previous literature, such as Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003), has tried to explain away the border effect found in McCallum (1995), I attempt to
understand exactly what the border effect is composed of. In Chapter II, I demonstrate that the
border effect is heterogeneous across regions in the same country. Further, I demonstrate that a
cause of this heterogeneity is importer market size. Ease of marketing access, as well as fixed costs
of crossing the border resulting in lower per-unit costs, mean that economically larger regions of a
country are better able to trade internationally than their smaller counterparts.
The second key contribution is the examination of internal transportation costs. While
transportation costs have long been a focus of the international trade literature, researchers
typically have focused on the transportation costs of moving a good from one country to another.
This completely ignores an important component of transportation costs: getting a good from
the place of production to the port of export. In Chapter III, I demonstrate that internal
transportation costs significantly lower international trade levels. In doing so, I employ a unique
instrumental variable strategy to handle the endogeneity of production location.
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The final contribution is demonstrating that joining the European Union has heterogeneous
effects across member nations. In Chapter IV, I revisit the well known fact that the E.U., on
average, increases trade with between its members, known as trade creation, while simultaneously
lowering trade with non-E.U. members, known as trade diversion. This average effect is what
is typically calculated in the international trade literature. I then go one step further and
demonstrate that each of these effects differs from member to member. Indeed, the Eastern Bloc
countries not only see significantly more trade with E.U. members than the average country,
they actually increase trade with non-E.U. members as well. While the literature has often noted
that the European Union has had a positive effect on trade, without fully understanding the
heterogeneity of the trade creation and trade diversion effects one cannot say if a specific member
benefited, or indeed if a specific country should seek to join the E.U.
The chapters of this dissertation offer several avenues of future research. Chapter II
demonstrates that the border effect is also a function of exporter size. Larger regions face a
smaller border effect when exporting. However, no explanation is offered for this heterogeneity.
Future research could explain why exporter market size is important. While Chapter III is
innovative in demonstrating that the costs of moving a good from the place of production to
the port of export matter, data limitations prevented me from examining an equally important
trade cost: the transportation cost of moving a good from the port of entry to its final customer.
Understanding these costs would allow for a complete understanding of each link in the
transportation of internationally traded goods. By continuing with these avenues of research,
society can make better informed trade policy in a world where lowering tariffs is no longer a
viable options.
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APPENDIX
TABLES AND FIGURES
TABLE 1. States Excluded from Previous Literature
Alaska Arkansas Colorado Connecticut
Delaware Hawaii Iowa Kansas
Mississippi Nebraska Nevada New Mexico
Oklahoma Oregon Rhode Island South Carolina
South Dakota Utah West Virginia Wyoming
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TABLE 2. Border Heterogeneity - OLS - Independent Variable ln
(
Xij
YiYj
)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AvW AvW AvW AvW
Log Distance -1.902∗∗∗ -1.919∗∗∗ -1.902∗∗∗ -1.919∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035)
Border Dummy -2.009∗∗∗ -3.269∗∗∗ -4.880∗∗∗ -6.055∗∗∗
(0.080) (0.651) (0.595) (0.886)
Distance X Border 0.167∗ 0.159∗
(0.086) (0.087)
Importer Market Size X Border 0.269∗∗∗ 0.267∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.054)
Importer Exporter Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of States 48 48 48 48
Observations 3118 3118 3118 3118
R2 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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TABLE 3. Robustness Check - OLS - Independent Variable ln
(
Xij
YiYj
)
(1) (2)
AvW AvW
Log Distance -1.919∗∗∗ -1.923∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.035)
Border Dummy -6.055∗∗∗ -6.003∗∗∗
(0.886) (0.898)
Distance X Border 0.159∗ 0.188∗∗
(0.087) (0.088)
Importer Market Size X Border 0.267∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.066)
Log Importer Population Density x Border Dummy 0.135∗∗
(0.061)
Importer Exporter Fixed Effect Yes Yes
Number of States 48 48
Observations 3118 3118
R2 0.997 0.997
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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TABLE 4. Robustness Checks - OLS - Independent Variable ln
(
Xij
YiYj
)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AvW Exporter Size Importer and Exporter Coast Coast Interact
Log Distance -1.919∗∗∗ -1.918∗∗∗ -1.201∗∗∗ -1.201∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.035) (0.025) (0.025)
Border Dummy -6.055∗∗∗ -7.789∗∗∗ -1.685∗∗ -1.745∗∗
(0.886) (1.015) (0.854) (0.855)
Distance X Border 0.159∗ 0.155∗ -0.440∗∗∗ -0.437∗∗∗
(0.087) (0.088) (0.077) (0.077)
Importer Market Size X Border 0.267∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗ 0.266∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.055) (0.054) (0.054)
Exporter Market Size X Border 0.159∗∗∗
(0.045)
Importer Coastal States -7.788∗∗∗ -8.115∗∗∗
(0.441) (0.439)
Exporter Coastal States -0.864∗∗ -0.512
(0.383) (0.384)
Importer Coast X Border Dummy 0.335
(0.470)
Exporter Coast X Border Dummy -0.537
(0.487)
Importer Exporter Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of States 48 48 48 48
Observations 3118 3118 3118 3118
R2 0.997 0.997 0.998 0.998
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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TABLE 5. Poisson Estimations - Independent Variable
(
Xij
YiYj
)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PQML PQML PQML PQML PQML PQML: (1-Border)
Log Distance -2.079∗∗∗ -2.016∗∗∗ -2.019∗∗∗ -2.017∗∗∗ -2.019∗∗∗ -1.948∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.164)
Border Dummy -1.089∗∗∗ -1.089∗∗∗ -1.479 -1.396∗ -1.774 -3.453∗∗∗
(0.107) (0.088) (0.945) (0.764) (1.285) (1.254)
Distance X Border 0.057 0.057
(0.130) (0.131)
Importer Market Size X Border 0.029 0.029
(0.072) (0.073)
(1-Border) X Distance 0.604∗∗∗
(0.153)
(1-Border) X Market Size -0.591∗∗∗
(0.026)
Importer Exporter Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of States 30 48 48 48 48 48
Observations 1582 3143 3143 3143 3143 3143
R2
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
TABLE 6. Negative Binomial Estimations - Independent Variable
(
Xij
YiYj
)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NB NB NB NB NB: (1-Border)
Log Distance -2.079∗∗∗ -2.016∗∗∗ -2.019∗∗∗ -2.019∗∗∗ -1.912∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.163)
Border Dummy -1.089∗∗∗ -1.089∗∗∗ -1.479 -1.774 -3.689∗∗∗
(0.107) (0.088) (0.945) (1.285) (1.254)
Distance X Border 0.057 0.057
(0.130) (0.131)
Importer Market Size X Border 0.029
(0.073)
(1-Border) X Distance 0.571∗∗∗
(0.152)
(1-Border) X Market Size -0.593∗∗∗
(0.026)
Importer Exporter Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of States 30 48 48 48 48
Observations 1582 3143 3143 3143 3143
R2
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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TABLE 7. Summary Statistics for Internal Distance by Product
mean max min sd count
Barley 1706 2217 1526 307 7
Grain 1006 2644 606 570 50
Maize 1448 3486 840 452 96
Oats 1797 2567 1094 463 19
Potatoes 2148 3121 1561 564 29
Rice 1592 3536 859 642 99
Soy 1459 2655 932 408 44
Tobacco 898 3526 510 555 41
Tomatoes 2648 3252 821 857 16
Wheat 1628 2162 1107 273 78
Total 1515 3536 510 630 479
All numbers are reported in miles.
TABLE 8. Products Included in Sample
HS Code Description Non-IV Sample IV Sample
0701 Potatoes (except sweet potatoes), fresh or chilled Yes Yes
0702 Tomatoes, fresh or chilled Yes Yes
0708 Leguminous vegetables, shelled or not, fresh or chilled Yes No
0805 Citrus fruit, fresh or dried Yes No
0806 Grapes, fresh or dried Yes No
0808 Apples, pears, and quinces, fresh Yes No
0809 Apricots, cherries, peaches, plums & sloes, fresh Yes No
1001 Wheat and meslin Yes Yes
1003 Barley Yes Yes
1004 Oats Yes Yes
1005 Corn (maize) Yes Yes
1006 Rice Yes Yes
1007 Grain sorghum Yes Yes
1201 Soybeans, whether or not broken Yes Yes
1202 Peanuts (ground-nuts), raw Yes No
1206 Sunflower seeds, whether or not broken Yes No
1214 Rutabagas, hay, clover & other forage products Yes No
2401 Tobacco, unmanufactured Yes Yes
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TABLE 9. Internal Distance Gravity Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Basic Reg, No IV Basic Reg, 2SLS Controls Reg, No IV Controls Reg, 2SLS
Log of External Distance -1.053∗∗ -1.068∗∗∗ -0.445 -0.465∗
(0.382) (0.211) (0.415) (0.262)
Log of Internal Distance -1.936∗∗∗ -1.669∗∗∗ -2.002∗∗∗ -1.754∗∗∗
(0.479) (0.504) (0.518) (0.497)
Log of Importer GDP 0.533∗∗∗ 0.538∗∗∗ 0.431∗∗∗ 0.433∗∗∗
(0.086) (0.057) (0.074) (0.073)
Contiguity Dummy 1.796 1.772∗∗
(1.039) (0.759)
Common Language Dummy -0.294 -0.318
(0.274) (0.272)
Log of Importer Area 0.012 0.014
(0.087) (0.064)
Colonial Dummy 0.411 0.408
(0.564) (0.475)
RTA Dummy 1.010∗ 1.002∗∗∗
(0.529) (0.337)
Common Currency Dummy 0.476 0.467
(0.565) (0.607)
Fixed Effects Used Commodity Commodity Commodity Commodity
Observations 479 479 479 479
R2 0.241 0.240 0.274 0.274
First-stage F-stat 400.859 403.439
P-value of test ln intdist 6= ln dist 0.272 0.292 0.100 0.031
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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TABLE 10. Internal Distance Gravity Regressions: Standardized Coefficients
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Basic Reg, No IV Basic Reg, 2SLS Controls Reg, No IV Controls Reg, 2SLS
Log of External Distance -0.183∗∗ -0.186∗∗∗ -0.077 -0.081∗
(0.382) (0.211) (0.415) (0.262)
Log of Internal Distance -0.257∗∗∗ -0.222∗∗∗ -0.266∗∗∗ -0.233∗∗∗
(0.479) (0.504) (0.518) (0.497)
Log of Importer GDP 0.349∗∗∗ 0.352∗∗∗ 0.282∗∗∗ 0.283∗∗∗
(0.086) (0.057) (0.074) (0.073)
Contiguity Dummy 0.109 0.108∗∗
(1.039) (0.759)
Common Language Dummy -0.043 -0.046
(0.274) (0.272)
Log of Importer Area 0.009 0.010
(0.087) (0.064)
Colonial Dummy 0.032 0.031
(0.564) (0.475)
RTA Dummy 0.119∗ 0.118∗∗∗
(0.529) (0.337)
Common Currency Dummy 0.030 0.029
(0.565) (0.607)
Fixed Effects Used Commodity Commodity Commodity Commodity
Observations 479 479 479 479
R2 0.241 0.240 0.274 0.274
First-stage F-stat 400.859 403.439
P-value of test ln intdist 6= ln dist 0.272 0.292 0.100 0.031
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
TABLE 11. Internal Distance Gravity Regressions - Various Years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1992 1997 2002 2007
Log of External Distance -0.424∗ -0.809∗∗∗ -0.832∗∗∗ -1.035∗∗∗
(0.252) (0.224) (0.221) (0.211)
Log of Internal Distance -1.609∗∗ -1.006∗ -1.061∗∗ -1.554∗∗∗
(0.653) (0.603) (0.540) (0.505)
Log of Importer GDP 0.437∗∗∗ 0.579∗∗∗ 0.538∗∗∗ 0.570∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.063) (0.060) (0.057)
Fixed Effects Used Commodity Commodity Commodity Commodity
Type of Intrsument Yes, 2SLS Yes, 2SLS Yes, 2SLS Yes, 2SLS
Observations 326 369 354 471
R2 0.144 0.199 0.220 0.248
First-stage F-stat 358.056 368.457 393.704 418.454
P-value of test ln intdist 6= ln dist 0.101 0.761 0.704 0.360
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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TABLE 12. Trade Creation and Trade Diversion in the E.U.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EU Border Effect Market Size Effect EU Border Effect EU Border Effect
EU to EU trade 0.234∗∗∗ 2.312∗∗∗ 0.938∗∗∗ 0.187∗
(0.042) (0.402) (0.064) (0.107)
EU to Non-EU trade -0.149∗∗∗ 0.164 0.348∗∗∗ -0.079
(0.024) (0.164) (0.040) (0.066)
Euro to Euro trade -0.074 0.009 0.194∗∗
(0.052) (0.054) (0.093)
Importer GDP * EU to EU dummy -0.074∗∗∗
(0.023)
Exporter GDP * EU to EU dummy -0.099∗∗∗
(0.025)
Importer GDP * EU to non-EU dummy -0.027∗∗
(0.011)
Exporter GDP * EU to non-EU dummy -0.001
(0.012)
Sample all all Eastern Bloc Scandinavia
Observations 532017 532017 45994 34480
Fixed Effects Importer-Exporter Importer-Exporter Importer-Exporter Importer-Exporter
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.105 0.105 0.106 0.090
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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TABLE 13. Individual Trade Creation and Trade Diversion Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Country EU to EU EU to EU Standard Error EU to Non-EU EU to Non-EU Standard Error
Austria -0.126 0.122 -0.220 0.084
Bulgaria 1.063 0.129 0.569 0.085
Cyprus 0.503 0.152 0.032 0.010
CzechRep 0.110 0.142 0.031 0.086
Denmark 0.742 0.181 0.248 0.089
Estonia 0.355 0.163 0.219 0.106
Finland -0.130 0.154 -0.038 0.089
Greece -0.869 0.166 -0.740 0.101
Hungary 0.798 0.154 -0.009 0.091
Ireland 0.475 0.191 0.193 0.120
Latvia 0.636 0.205 0.245 0.114
Lithuania -0.165 0.204 -0.295 0.129
Malta 0.677 0.172 0.329 0.099
Poland 1.122 0.129 0.375 0.082
Portugal -0.012 0.186 -0.310 0.089
Romania 0.913 0.170 -0.057 0.110
Slovakia 0.647 0.165 0.315 0.107
Slovenia 0.398 0.180 0.248 0.125
Spain -0.295 0.150 -0.459 0.072
Sweden -0.125 0.131 -0.301 0.086
UK 0.492 0.170 0.111 0.090
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FIGURE 1. A Map of Provincial Border Effects
FIGURE 2. A Map of State Border Effects
67
FIGURE 3. Graph of the Implied Border Effect Over Various Importer Market Sizes
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FIGURE 4. Imports and Exports Before and After Joining the EU - Austria and Bulgaria
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FIGURE 5. Imports and Exports Before and After Joining the EU - Cyprus and Czech Rep.
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FIGURE 6. Imports and Exports Before and After Joining the EU - Denmark and Estonia
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FIGURE 7. Imports and Exports Before and After Joining the EU - Finland and Greece
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FIGURE 8. Imports and Exports Before and After Joining the EU - Hungary and Ireland
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FIGURE 9. Imports and Exports Before and After Joining the EU - Latvia and Lithuania
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FIGURE 10. Imports and Exports Before and After Joining the EU - Malta and Poland
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FIGURE 11. Imports and Exports Before and After Joining the EU - Portugal and Romania
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FIGURE 12. Imports and Exports Before and After Joining the EU - Slovakia and Slovenia
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FIGURE 13. Imports and Exports Before and After Joining the EU - Spain and Sweden
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FIGURE 14. Imports and Exports Before and After Joining the EU - United Kingdom
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